Hedging My Bets on the Russian Winter Checkmate

I've gone too far

I found another Russia commentator recently who blogs on Substack.

He believes that it’s all about to go down in a big way very soon. Since his opinion contrasts so vastly from mine, I figure it’s worth looking into his analyses in more detail.

Let’s see what he has to say together:

1. First, there are two reputable channels which are now confirming major actions are coming within a week. Romanov Lite, who many of you know, is a Crimean based commentator who also works with some Russian/Donbass units, helping supply them and is often seen on the lines with them, often has insider info as he speaks directly to the troops. He posted this message that it is soon GO TIME:

Note, the specific confirmation of something we predicted here in one of the recent reports, which is that the offensive is likely to kick off, not all at once but in several stages in order to maximize confusion, allow a little lead time for AFU to frantically send reserves to one direction to caulk the flow, only for a completely different direction to massively kick off into un-reinforced territory.

First of all, I don’t think that there are “insiders”. Inside of what, exactly? A platoon? Talking to soldiers gives this man an insider perspective? Because he is a volunteer?

I know literally dozens of volunteers. Some of them have Telegram channels of their own. I respect the work they do, but I don’t take anything that they say seriously.

Furthermore, no one has any real “insights” based on secret information to share. If they did, they wouldn’t be posting freely for long.

So, this guy posts “It’s Go Time” with no proofs, from what I can tell. Meanwhile, a year ago, not even Lavrov or Peskov knew about the SMO until literally the moment after it started.

But this Telegram volunteer is a Putin confidant, apparently.

Also, the part about a “staggered offensive” is, well, I don’t really know what that means. It appears to be a cleverly disguised hedge. In the absence of a coordinated, visible attack, we can now just say that, actually, the reason that there isn’t a large offensive is because the attack is being “staggered”.

2. Then, another reputable channel issued this urgent call of alarm:

“From "2 Majors" TG Channel:
--
Residents of Ukraine
Everyone understands that the past month, during which the Russian Armed Forces seized the initiative, was a preparation . Open sources mention the Sumy, Chernigov, Kharkov and Zaporizhia as possible directions for an offensive.
People living in these territories can see for themselves signs of how the AFU are preparing these cities and areas for defense. The area is being mined, fortifications are being built, military columns and buses with mercenaries are moving.
The Ukrainian command has good intelligence from American satellites, processed by experienced analytical centers.
But official Kiev does not announce the evacuation of the population. Because fortified areas are being built in cities and the civilian population will once again become a human shield. Evacuation in Kupyansk was announced after the Russian Armed Forces approached the city at 7-10 km.
It is absolutely necessary for Ukrainians to leave these cities. The Russian Armed Forces will no longer conduct a police operation. Such nonsense as it was in Mariupol, when the position of an enemy sniper/machine gunner could not be demolished because in a dilapidated five-story building "there can be civilians", will no longer apply.
And after all the horrific videos of tortures and shootings of our soldiers, the joyful reaction of a large number of Ukrainians to them, the attitude of soldiers and officers to "peaceful population" has changed somewhat.”

First, he names literally all the cities as potential targets. That’s not a prediction, folks. He names cities in the north, east, and south. In other words, he doesn’t know. Nobody knows where this supposed offensive is coming from. Why he didn’t just add Odessa or Lvov to the list escapes me. Perhaps a naval assault is being prepared, who knows lol add it to the list.

The rest is just meaningless babble.

What is this TG blogger even saying? That Russia will now bomb the civilian population indiscriminately because the soldiers are mad? Is this a good thing? A sound strategy? Proof of a massive offensive that will crush Ukraine? Thank God he’s talking out of his ass.

3. Recently we had the first ever confirmation—with actual photographic evidence—of Russian force buildups on Ukraine’s border resembling those of pre-Feb. 2022. Here are satellite photos of one of them; there are reportedly such camps in Kursk and Voronezh regions, which are directly above Sumy and Kharkov oblasts of Ukraine.

The photos, if true, are the first piece of actual proof presented so far.

I mean, it’s literally just proof of military vehicles being moved up to a frontline, which isn’t really a smoking gun, but OK, to be fair, it could be.

4. There are now several reports of large field hospitals being constructed in at least two different regions, again reminiscent of exactly what happened last time prior to the start of the SMO. And a senior lieutenant of the AFU stated that 10,000 Russian troops have amassed across the border from Sumy.

Well, the link is behind a paywall. So I can’t comment on it. As for the 10k troops, well, first of all, that’s very little.

If anything, that’s proof of nothing at all.

I don’t discount that they might be deployed and that a new, northern front will be opened. In fact, I was saying that this was the only move that made any sense months ago.

But 10k is far too little. 100-150k wasn’t enough a year ago, remember? And now, 10k will swing the balance in Russia’s favor?

Am I missing something here?

Interestingly, this is characterized as ‘the largest concentration that’s ever been there’, including in the buildup of last year. 10k doesn’t seem like a lot of troops. But it only goes to show the accuracy of our premise from the Part 1 report, which found that Russia used only a small fraction of the troops everyone thought they did. Last year’s Sumy incursion must have likewise been very small, a brigade or two in size (or rather, several BTG’s).

Yeah, and what happened to those incursions? Did the Russians win? What are we even talking about here?

Another report:

According to foreign intelligence, there is a tactical group of the Russian Armed Forces with a total of 26,800 people on the territory of Belarus. The group of forces is armed with 18 combat aircraft and 25 helicopters of various types, as well as 116 tanks, including T-90, and several hundred armored combat vehicles.

Cool. Thats more than I thought. Still too little to do more than a feint. These 26k troops aren’t going to be conquering large swaths of territory or storming cities, let me tell you right now. Give them 200k and then, maybe.

5. A massive 80km long convoy of Russian army supply trucks is reported to be currently in transit slowly through mud between Mariupol & Berdiansk, according to ‘advisor to the mayor of Mariupol’ Petro Andryuschenko. Keep in mind this is the exiled Ukrainian ‘ex-advisor’ to the previous Mariupol administration prior to its liberation.

…

Andryuschenko is the same one who reported last time that Russian troops have massively increased by ‘tens of thousands’ north of Mariupol, which was later specified as going from 10k to 30k troops.

This isn’t proof of a large Russian offensive coming from the south. It’s proof of a large Ukrainian offensive that Russia is preparing for.

Again, we’re talking about small numbers of troops here.

At most, Russia mobilized 500k troops. This and what they have already, puts them at parity with Ukraine from the fall. But, Ukraine continues to mobilize men. So, if anything, they’re going to have more men than the Russians, again.

6. Ukrainian MP Goncharenko claims that in far western Belarus, a group of ‘Wagner’ soldiers were spotted.

And?

7. And buses reportedly full of 1700 Wagner soldiers are being sent toward Zaporozhe (one of the imminent lines of attack in the coming offensive):

See above.

However, some believe they could be headed to Ugledar, which would make more logical sense as Wagner fighters are known as urban combat specialists. And in the last few days, Russian Marines have finally entrenched themselves in the first urban settlements right at the outskirts of Ugledar, which could mean that Wagner is now being sent in to prepare for actual urban storming of said town.

Have we changed the goalposts again? A tactical action with less than 2k troops to take a small rusted out soviet town is now a large offensive?

And what about Bakhmut? From what I hear, it’s not been taken yet.

8. Russian Buks and other AD is also seen moving from the Mariupol direction toward the likely offensive vectors.

See above.

9. Now, keep in mind there are also dissenting voices who claim that not only is no ‘large offensive’ coming any time soon, but that Russia is in fact ‘incapable’ of even launching any such offensive.

Feel free to link me next time!

We should have the debate!

Then there’s talk about how Russia will use fighter jets and balloons and drones in new ways going forward. I really can’t comment on that. I have no clue about such things.

Let the balloons fly, I say. I am pro-balloon, generally.

11. Putin met Lukashenko in Moscow yesterday. Such in person meetings between important people often occur on the eve of something momentous, as likely they need to speak in private about the final logistical details and preparations vis a vis any Russian forces that may potentially be moving in/from/around Belarus—or other sundry Belarusian participation, be it logistical or otherwise.

A meeting with Luka isn’t proof of anything. They meet rather often. It could, in fact, simply be proof of further Belarussian-Russian integration and a new deal about to be announced.

12. The large reported die-down of both Russian artillery and long range missile strikes (they still happen, just not as often—at one point once per week, now every 2-3 weeks) is likely a final buildup of stores and inventory before launching larger, coordinated offensives. With that said, Russian missile strikes did tick up recently but they were in smaller, more focused batches than usual.

This one is a little bit 5D, sorry. Instead of being proof of an ammo shortage, it’s actually proof of a secret plan to mass more ammo. Don’t buy it.

13. Mentioned in an earlier report, Putin is now officially scheduled to give a big State of the Nation address on February 21st, which falls precisely on the anniversary of his pivotal Feb. 21, 2022 speech where he first announced the recognition of LPR/DPR’s independence, leading the way to the big Feb. 24 speech which announced the actual full military launch of the SMO invasion.

Indeed. And people are speculating on what he will say. No one knows, really. Bringing up the existence of the scheduled speech isn’t proof of a large offensive.

The speech presumably would also make an effort to outline Russia’s new/updated goals of the SMO to give the people an idea of what this is all really about, and a possible notion of how/when people can expect the war to end.

Why not mention the rumors that he’s going to move from SMO to anti-terror operation? You mentioned “wild rumors” about Ossetia being incorporated into Russia, but not that there may be a scale down? Why the tactical silence? People are talking about it in Russia. Also, the author of this piece reads my blog where I reported on it. So he knows about it.

And yet not even a mention of the possibility. Not even to point out that it is improbable or stupid or whatever. Just more tactical silence. Typical 5D modus operandi, unfortunately. Starving the sheep of alternative information. Sad.

14. Putin just made some big appointments and promotions in the general staff. Andrey Mordvichev, who reportedly led the assaults on Azovstal, has been promoted to general of Central Military District (which Lapin used to command). Lt. General Muradov, who was promoted late last year to commander of Eastern Military District, has now been promoted to the rank of Colonel General.

Colonel General Kuzovlev has been appointed as the commander of Southern Military District, and Lt. General Nikiforov has been appointed as head of Western Military District. This too is indicative of major forthcoming moves.

Yeah, but these replacements have been happening for a while now. Shoigu ditched three generals in January because of an embezzlement scandal. Is that proof of a looming, major, super-offensive too?

The far better explanation for all these shuffles is internal politics.

**

Finally, the author provides his conclusions. So far, I haven’t really seen any concrete proof of a large-scale Russian offensive provided. I think that people just expect one to happen. It would make sense in some sort of poetic sense, I suppose.

But the more likely method remains a slow-rolled and ‘staggered’ offensive, which we also talked about last time. This is where each new front/vector would be activated at a time, in order to let UA pour reserves there, and take them away from other key regions, then invade the remaining now-depleted region.

So it’s going to be a “staggered” offensive.

I don’t really see how this is any different from what we see already, but OK, maybe brighter minds can explain the difference to me.

,mThe most likely starting vector is looking more and more like Zaporozhe simply because the most confirmed activity is being seen in the sector involving Mariupol toward Kherson. The reason is because it’s the most critical. On one hand, I outlined in part 2 how Putin’s constitutional decrees/obligations mean that Kharkov and the remainder of Lugansk would need to be taken with utmost priority. HOWEVER, the breaking of AFU lines in Zaporozhe has even higher priority than that due to the fact that this is where Russia’s weakest point remains, owing to the vulnerability of Crimea.

It’s an open secret UA intends to build for a mass Spring offensive in the direction of Zaporozhe in order to sever the Crimean landbridge, which would come with simultaneously coordinated attempts to sever the Kerch bridge (whether terror actions or newly received GLSDB’s, ATACMs, etc.). This would catastrophically cut Crimea off, and so even the (unlikely) prospect of such an event means Russia needs to establish initiative here with utmost authority and priority, and basically ‘break the AFU’s back’ in this region.

Thus I suspect they will likely strike here first and begin pushing UA back toward Zaporozhe city. We’ve already reported last time that—foreseeing this—Ukrainian authorities have already begun fortifying the center of Zaporozhe city, as they know combat is coming to it very soon.

OK. Yes. We all do know that something big is going to go down there.

But that’s all we know.

After that, in staggered fashion, once UA has desperately sent reserves to reinfroce the Zaporozhe line, another large Russian force could likely move into either Kharkov or Sumy/Chernigov regions, or maybe all of those northern regions at the same time.

So, basically, the place that the Ukrainians are about to attack will see heavy fighting and then, Russia will, eventually, stagger into Kharkov later, at some indefinite time in the future.

Did I read that right?

This is how we’re seeing it so far, but it could change. And there’s also good reason to believe that Russia may in fact be playing it by ear to the extent that, in modern warfare, you can’t set concrete plans and put all your eggs in one basket. As we mentioned in the ISR article, there are way too many variables in how your enemy can expose your movements, and as such, it’s best to draw up very fluid/variable/modular plans whose pieces can be modified at any given time to thwart the ISR overreach of your opponent. Not to mention this is all part of basic maskirovka 101.

Now we’re back to “no concrete plans” and more hedging.

Hence, I suspect Russia has its main vectors/objectives set in a fluid Jeet Kune Do fashion, such that they can be swapped momentarily.

So we’ll see in the next few days if any new big updates give us further insight and clarity.

Ah, I see that we’ve moved on from 5D Judo to 5D Jeet Kune Do.

I think this is a fitting new metaphor, since Bruce Lee’s fabled martial art was mostly screeching and puffed up nonsense.

But hey, we’ve only got a day left to wait for the big announcement.

Unfortunately, I don’t expect any real clarity from Putin’s speech. It will take another few weeks or months of self-styled experts “decoding” what Putin really meant and whether the nose scratch between paragraphs three and four was actually a secret signal to prepare an underwater sub invasion of Odessa or something.

**

My prediction: the fighting will intensify in the coming weeks and months as both sides try to eke out last minute gains before the scale down.