Let's Talk About the Energy Strikes Because Why Not?

For lack of anything better to do, both pundits and peasants alike in Russia are discussing the effects of strikes on energy infrastructure in Ukraine. As usual, there’s a lot of shum around this topic and it’s hard to come to any conclusions about what is really going on and how effective any of it will be on anything. For example, what looked to be an angry crowd in Odessa upset at Kiev stealing their power could have been locals mad about a blown transformer or something.

Horesmi🚩🇺🇦 @Horesmi

There is footage of locals in Odessa protesting against lack of electricity. Here is the truth: - it was a local issue, the city services refused to fix a transformer because that neighborhood was poor - it worked, the problem was fixed (1/2)

First of all, the neighborhood isn’t poor by Odessa standards, so that’s a lie. But there is no second of all. I know for a fact that there are periodic electricity blackouts in Kiev - certain hours where it’s cut off. Does that mean that Kiev will start siphoning from other parts of the country? I don’t know. It doesn’t seem inconceivable. I guess they’d do it if they could, so the question is whether or not they have the technical capability to do so and I’m no electrician/civil engineer to weigh in on that conclusively one way or the other.

As for the larger picture, the justification for the strikes is that it is hurting Ukraine’s military potential.

I don’t really know about that either. Not having a steady supply of electricity is not fun, sure, but does it really affect the war effort?

For one thing, even the Russian authorities admit that they can’t blackout the whole country. Ukraine will have to wait to join the EU and for the WEF to come in before Greta Thunberg forces them back into the stone age to save the climate. So, whatever electricity there will be will be prioritized for the army.

For the most part, the Ukrainians are getting deliveries of weapons from Europe from the West. They are transported on rail or by truck. Ukraine has diesel that it can use for both modes of transportation. As for electricity and the army, it probably affects the training? Maybe? The army certainly doesn’t need it in the field or while on the move.

So, really, all that we’re debating is whether or not we’re convinced that the Russian command is getting serious about the war effort or not. The strikes, which were begun in earnest right after Kharkev, seem to have been designed with PR in mind. Either they were trying to inflict pain on Kiev to bring it to the negotiating table or they were doing it to assuage Russians at home or both, of course.

The only problem with planning to hold negotiations with Ukraine is that a) Zelensky has made it illegal to do so and b) the Neocons who run Washington want the Slavlands to run red with blood for one reason or another.

But, US officials met with the Russians in Turkey, so we’ll see what came of that soon. That’s probably the next big analysis post that you’ll read from me if anything comes of it. So far, it’s just the damn grain thing again. I don’t know why they’re so obsessed with that - it’s kind of a head-scratcher. Perhaps the diplomats are bored too and have nothing better to talk about while the real war rages on.

The question that we ought to be discussing is where the Ukrainians will mass up and attack next. I’ve been on the road and haven’t been following the usual autists on social media talking about troop concentrations. I checked in again today and didn’t see much. My guess is that we should find out soon though. I’d be very surprised if Kiev didn’t build on its momentum and decided to just be happy with the gains that it made now.

As for news on the home front, Russia is still processing the shock of Kherson. As I wrote in my previous piece, the authorities are starting to advance the narrative that “pseudo-patriots” are dangerous to the war effort. The truth is that it’s people in the elite who are dangerous to the war effort and doing everything to hamper and handicap it. They then use the media that they control to invert the truth. The “pseudo-patriots” don’t have any institutional power outside of veterans organizations, historical societies, parts of the military and, possibly, the GRU. Meanwhile the majority of the media, celebrity, economic and bureaucratic class appears to be against any attempts to play hardball with the West. Who is really the threat here, I wonder?

As has become almost commonplace now, there is also talk of switching to a war economy. For the life of me, I cannot see how this is a bad idea. America’s base of prosperity was built on the war machine of WWII. Why Russia couldn’t do the same is beyond me. Well, that’s not true, I suppose. Lots of oligarchs stand to lose quite a bit if the economy is re-nationalized. Putin has promised to not do so at every economic forum that he has attended. But, if media coverage is any indication, the authorities don’t mind the idea being discussed in polite society. I think it’s possible that some sort of halfsy war economy measures will be take. I can’t believe I’m writing these words, but Russia is struggling to arm itself right now. They’re buying stuff from Iran, Best Korea and the Chinese. Maybe they ought to reopen some factories at home instead.

As things stand now, the only reliable way to make any predictions about what can happen on the war front is to simply tally up soldier totals. Russia is fighting at a huge numerical disadvantage. The mobilization effort will only put them close to par with the Ukrainians and the undisclosed numbers of NATO goonsquads operating in the country. It will take another million men at least to be able to decisively swing the war effort one way or the other. No large offensives can be undertaken from the Russian side as things stand now and the best they can hope for is to shore up their gains with the reinforcements by winter.

So, effectively, the reality on the ground of this war is about how quickly one side can mobilize more men than the other. If there is any urgency on Moscow’s side, they do a good job of not showing it. No one apart from the usual Strelkovite doomer types is even mentioning it. The narrative appears to be that winter will see the start of a new offensive. Unless the mobilization is actually a lot larger than reported, I don’t see how that is possible. Chances are, this conversation will be had much later, after we know one way or another. Between then and now there’s another month of nail-biting suspense as we wonder whether and where the new Ukrainian breakthrough will be and how successful it’ll be.

All this talk about energy strikes and grain and blah-blah-blah is just a distraction from the simple math of the situation.

Unless a deal is struck, which seems rather unlikely barring huge Russian concessions, this war will be decided on the battlefield, which, given the troop numbers, will not be decisive any time soon.

I’m still waiting for some real developments within Russia to write about. I never really wanted to be a war-blogger and got my start talking about all the firings and Liberals fleeing the country, if you recall. I’d like to have more to report about on this front, but, other than a piece I’m preparing talking about the huge exodus of the youth and middle class from Russia, I don’t have much to report. No new wave of oligarchs dropping dead, no reshuffles at the top and very little word of any new kind of “Russian idea” as Dugin likes to pontificate about.

Never fear though, another kick in the butt soon will probably get the authorities in Russia scrambling to look busy and we’ll see what half-measure they come up with this time.