On the Military Analysts (Yes, Again)

Remember what I said about how the military analysts have ulterior motives for doom-posting about the war? Seems I was ahead of the pack in stating the obvious. Check out what Aleksandr Khodakovsky, one of the many commentators on the war, has to say on the topic.

Courtesy of Slavyangrad:

I will permit myself a few more words on the given topic… When I consider the position of the alarmists in the guise of patriots, who lobby for general mobilization, I am dismayed and astonished by their sophisticated hypocrisy. Once you [clear the bedlam of their tortured reasoning, the following narrative emerges]: Our military command, in their opinion, is completely incapable, and yet we must, nonetheless, conduct general mobilization and entrust this same command with new cannon fodder—because the old is coming to an end.

The only piece of advice I would want to give them—if they want to avoid being seen as duplicitous laughingstock—is to fix the contradiction. On the one hand, you are disparaging the command corps, and, on the other, you want to inspire and motivate people to fight for the Motherland in the very same army you are belittling. Or don’t you?

I would disagree with his assessment. The people he is railing against want new people put in charge of the military. Furthermore, while this war remains a volunteer effort fought by professional soldiers, it’s unlikely that they are being demoralized in the same way that conscripts would be. But whatever.

Not only that, while your whining and yammering repel the volunteers who otherwise would enlist in the army, but, having listened to, for instance, Strelkov, will think a hundred times before making the decision to join the fight, you are simultaneously pushing the political leadership of the country toward decreeing general mobilization. In other words, you are doing everything to make sure that no other alternative is left… Why? A few ideas come to mind…

[next two paragraphs from a previous post by Aleksandr Khodakovsky]

I have forgotten a lot from 2014 because of the incredible saturation of that period with events, but certain things have stuck in my memory particularly well. Especially a conversation I had with a pseudo-military “strategist,” formerly a science fiction writer, who argued that he was prepared to lose even 15% of the fighting cadres, so long as he could train the rest to go on the attack. Now he is among those who yammer the loudest, from the rear, that we must deploy, deploy, and deploy fresh troops to the front, to declare general mobilization, to bulldoze the enemy with numbers… What for? To drown the country in corpses? It is people like him, those who are prepared to lose “15% of the personnel,” that frighten me the most. It is very easy to use the lives of others in service of one’s own ambitions.

When I look ahead and consider the medium-term consequences of potential decisions, I remind myself of the discussions about the Western goal to break Russia in this war. This goal can be reached only as a result of delayed consequences, and not at all through a direct confrontation. It is the alarmists who will be the first to start rocking the boat if something goes wrong. While currently, we have a particular ratio of operational effectiveness to battlefield losses, pumping unprepared military personnel into the conflict will yield only an insignificant growth of effectiveness compared to the very palpable social discontent as a result of additional losses. What’s key is that the alarmists not only will absolve themselves of all responsibility, but, on the contrary, will use these consequences in their own interests, or, well, in the interests of the West, of course.

Well, the argument is that mobilization will allow for maneuver warfare and a swifter end to the conflict through the application of overwhelming force i.e., less losses.

[original post by Aleksandr Khodakovsky continues]

They despise the political regime and want nothing less than its overthrow. Turns out, that, in the event their plans materialize, they will find themselves in an unassailable position:

Here we go! The good stuff!

- If the war becomes endless, then the powers-that-be will be seen as responsible;

- if general mobilization and concomitant losses materialize, leaving their deep imprint on the entirety of the population—the very outcomes that the alarmists encourage and push for—then, once again, the powers-that-be are at fault, and the alarmists will then graciously explain how the incompetent political leadership wasted the human resource.

Could this be the very goal they are striving for?

Yep. That is indeed the goal. It was quite obvious from the beginning, really. Are people really still incapable of asking themselves the question “Qui Bono?” before conducting their analyses?

By critiquing the war effort, these people are trying to gain political cache, duh.

I am a proponent of the quickest possible resolution of the war through our victory, and, in saying this, I am guided by the following consideration: The victory must not be a pyrrhic one. We have resources to increase the effectiveness of the army—its capabilities are not being used to their full potential.

For instance, we recently faced a problem: the deficit of smoke and incendiary mines and shells in the entire [DNR People’s Militia] Corps. I only had a dozen of each type left [in the Vostok Brigade], but this made little difference, considering the dire need for these types of ammunition. Had we run out of this resource in our ammunition depots? Impossible. It simply had not been delivered.

There are many such examples, and all of them indicate that the military machine has not yet been engaged to its full potential. How could general mobilization possibly help in this regard? The army can operate more effectively with its current composition, if only we bring all the supply and organization processes of the military work to their necessary levels. This is exactly what we will do.

Fair enough.

Finally, once more about the volunteers. They are many of them and they are ready to fight. Just yesterday I spent the evening talking, late into the night, with a not inconsiderable group of Russians—fine guys—who came to see for themselves how things are, and we discussed the reasons for the slow momentum of the volunteer movement. Among the key reasons, they called out the work of our “patriots,” who thump their chests to prove how Russian they are and how they would do anything for victory, and yet they deal incredible damage to the cause with their views.

One of my interlocutors explained this idea simply and clearly, saying: “At first, I read Strelkov and thought how catastrophic everything is, and that everyone, including you”—here he addressed me—“were complete assholes, who are worthy only of being hanged, but, soon after, I understood that listening to people like that, I would never fulfill my duty to my own conscience, and so I came specifically to you, precisely because Strelkov castigates you—it means that you are a real human being.”

Well, that seems a bit harsh. Strelkov, who is often wrong, yes, was proven right. He claimed that no encirclement of the Ukrainian forces was possible with the number of troops that Russia was operating with. He said that this conflict would drag on. Getting mad at the man instead of conceding that he may have been right seems rather petty.

But, again, now that there are different factions vying for political points on the home-front, it’s become a partisan debate. Me, I think that the more hardcore patriotic elements ought to be brought into the government. This would put a damper on their rabble-rousing and it would also make the government less Liberal. Why make these people your enemies when you have enough of those already?

I guess we’ll have to wait a couple of months for some Russian blogger to come to the same conclusion as me before I get a chance to preen and gloat again.