Putin: Russia Remains Committed to Multi-Kulti Antifa Values in Wake of Deadly Muslim Terror Killings!

It is a question of morality and ethics.

I suppose everyone knows by now about the appalling terrorist attacks in Moscow. The first few days after these attacks there is so much disinfo circulating that it is hard to draw any conclusions about what happened. I prefer to let things calm down a bit before chiming in with my opinions.

I think that the information as it stands now is that Tajiks waltzed across Russia’s open southern border, were paid 500,000$ and started shooting into a packed concert hall. They then packed up their gear and left for the Ukrainian border, where they were to be extracted. Russian soldiers caught them at the border (or some of them) and then tortured one on camera, at least, by cutting his ear off and making him eat it.

Personally, I believe that they deserved far worse, and sadly, there is footage of them being taken care of in the hospital now. I think that these killers should be treated at least as well as Gonzago Lira was by the SBU and not like the Azov torturers and killers that, well, what happened to them after they were taken into captivity again …

Yeah …

I believe that the most fruitful line of inquiry is related to the Azerbaijani connection. Here are the relevant connections:

• the building where this occurred was owned by Azerbaijanis

• there is video footage of these men shouting “Dagestan is Azerbaijan” while shooting

• Azerbaijan is now the main sponsor of Islamic terror gangs in Russia, behind Turkey

Obviously, Azerbaijan is also closely linked to Turkey and to Israel. Without Israel’s help, the Azeris would not have been able to prepare their military for war with Armenia, which they won, and which they will now build on by annexing more parts of Armenia. They also have territorial claims on lands controlled by the Russian Federation.

There isn’t much information out there about what is going on with the Islamist/Dagestani/Azeri situation there. But this old report I found covers the basics. Here:

The Dagestan Days festival opens in Baku this week (May 12–13), during which ties between that republic in the Russian North Caucasus and Azerbaijan will be celebrated and new business deals announced (Azertag.az, May 7). However, relations between these two Muslim republics are increasingly tense. Problems stem from their religiously and ethnically intermixed populations as well as controversies over land and water rights. These issues would exist even if no other powers were involved. But the Dagestani-Azerbaijani relationship is further strained by the broader geopolitical competition in the Caucasus between Russia, Turkey and Iran as well as the willingness of each of these powers to exploit such tensions for their own purposes.

In advance of the festival in Baku, Dagestani journalist Eduard Urazayev has surveyed some of these issues and suggests that, while “externally everything always is presented as wonderful,” it is “unfortunately” the case that just below the surface there are real dangers—even if the media in both Dagestan and Azerbaijan generally refuse to discuss them given their sensitivity. Moreover, he argues that the clearest indicators of how problematic the relationship has become can be seen in the absence of Azerbaijani investment in Dagestan as well as the slowness with which Dagestan has responded to the land needs of Azerbaijani refugees from the Karabakh war who relocated to the Northeastern Caucasus republic (Kavpolit.com, May 4).

Another problem in relations is the situation of members of Dagestani nationalities living just across the border in Azerbaijan. Under Azerbaijani law, they have equal rights; but they have sometimes complained of mistreatment not only because they are Sunni Muslims living in a predominantly Shiite state but also because they have sought to maintain their ties with co-ethnics in restive Dagestan. Both of these factors have caused Baku to view them with suspicion. And such an attitude is exacerbated by Azerbaijan’s desire to present itself as a full-fledged participant in the international battle against Islamist extremism. Furthermore, Moscow has used these groups, the Avars and Lezgins in particular, to put pressure on Baku or even undermine Azerbaijan’s control of its territory (see EDM, July 2, 2012; December 9, 2014).

Indeed, as Azerbaijani officials have previously pointed out—though which Urazayev does not mention—representatives of these two ethnic communities pose more of a religious threat than an ethnic one. One study found that the majority of 1,500 people from Azerbaijan who have gone to Syria to fight in the ranks of the Islamic State are from the predominantly Sunni north of the country and thus almost certainly consist of Avars and Lezgins rather than ethnic Azerbaijanis (Kavkazoved.info, November 6, 2015). As in Russia and Central Asia, Baku is particularly worried about how such people will behave when they return to Azerbaijan, especially given their links not only to the Islamic State but to the restive Muslim republic to the north, where most of their co-ethnics live.

These Azerbaijani concerns were heightened by more recent revelations about the increasing involvement of Shiite Iran and Sunni Turkey with their respective co-religionists inside Azerbaijan. Urazayev says that these developments have raised questions about the ultimate loyalty of those ethnic minorities to the Azerbaijani state. So far, these developments have not really affected the situation, he continues, “but if at the geopolitical level any radical shifts begin to take place, then this could be reflected on the Dagestanis in Azerbaijan,” with a possible crackdown by Baku that would have consequences in Makhachkala and Moscow. From Baku’s perspective, the recent flare-up of violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia and Russia’s tilt toward Yerevan make this all the more likely (Kavpolit.com, May 4).

And there could be two even more immediate triggers for new tensions, albeit ones neither Baku nor Makhachkala (including Urazayev) has talked much about. First, there is the continuing issue of the proper division of the use of water from the Samur River, which flows through Dagestan for most of its course but for 38 kilometers it is the border between that republic and Azerbaijan. In Soviet times and continuing until 2010, Moscow controlled the division of water between the two. But six years ago, Moscow and Baku agreed to a 50-50 split, an arrangement that not all Dagestanis have been happy with (Nazaccent.ru, August 13, 2014).

Under most conditions, such a split does not cause a problem for either side; but droughts last year and in 2016 have raised tensions because the river has almost completely dried up, leaving far too little water for residents on either side to irrigate their crops. Consequently, both have been left with less food and lower incomes. Dagestanis have complained to Moscow but so far without success; and Baku has been unresponsive, at least in part because those most affected on its side of the border are not ethnic Azerbaijanis but rather Avars and Lezgins.

Second is the issue of land for Azerbaijani refugees from the Karabakh war, who have relocated to Dagestan. Their numbers are relatively small, and Makachkala has tried to help them. But the two southern districts of that republic are dominated by Avars and Lezgins, who seem less inclined to help the refugees than officials in the Dagestani capital or Moscow (Pcnariman.livejournal.com, November 30, 2013).

In short, the border regions of Dagestan and Azerbaijan are showing signs of becoming a tinderbox that could easily burst into flame at the slightest provocation.

I do not know all the details of who was behind this attack and why, but I would be remiss for not pointing out that Russian patriots have written about the Azeri sponsorship of radical Islamic groups within Russia and in central asia.

I think this attack might have something to do with the assassination of the VP of Azeri-owned Lukoil recently that I covered recently. This is kind of a stretch on my part, I realize that, but idk, worth looking into at least:

This attack cannot be looked at on its own.

Because there has been a HUGE upsurge in terrorist attacks within Russia and sabotage attacks and strange assassinations all over the place. Again: patriot samizdat within Russia has been covering this, but there has been radio silence on the part of ZAnon and state media and Western media about this. It is crazy, but there is no official explanation for all the bombs going off in Russia.

Kiev often claims credit for some of the strikes, but not all of them, not by a long stretch. They did not claim credit for the killing of the Lukoil VP or for any of the 100 (is it more now?) deaths of powerful businessmen often of non-Russian extraction in the oil and gas industry or affiliated with the spook state.

A recent example of this was the Azeri-sponsored effort to desecrate an Orthodox religious site near Moscow, and their threats to take revenge on Russians for blocking the construction of a mosque there. I covered it all here:

Azerbaijan is playing the same game as Qatar or Saudi Arabia before it.

That is, with the help of Israeli intelligence, Azerbaijan is using its oil and gas money to fund these groups and to terrorize other governments into giving them what they want by using these groups as negotiating chips. And the governments of the target states are unable or unwilling to do anything about this because the Azeri government bribes politicians in, say, Russia, to do their bidding. Rossiyan oligarchs are heavily invested in Azerbaijan, which is why Shoigu did nothing when Azerbaijan shot at and killed the commanding officer of the Russian peacekeepers in the region, who were then promptly pulled out. The Russian government also refuses to provide support to Armenia, preferring to continue taking bribes from the Azeris despite the geopolitical consequences of letting Armenia out to dry and allowing Turkey and Azerbaijan to link up into a southern axis aimed at striking into Russia’s underbelly. Armenia has quit the CSTO as a result, and also because their own political class is beholden to Washington and Israel as well.

The basic outline of the situation I covered here:

So that’s where I’m at in my speculating.

I don’t have any new info to share at this moment about the conspirators behind the attack.

Oh, well, there is one more thing: the attack occurred on Purim. This is a holiday from the Old Testament in which Yahweh’s chosen made a preemptive strike on their Iranian adversaries, slaughtering many innocents and taking great joy in the fact. It was a holy offering to Yahweh, the god of the Bible, and the stories around Esther and Maccabees are the core ideology at the heart of Mossad. But Christians don’t like hearing this.

Food for thought for the rest of us though.