Strelkov has a very interesting perspective on the events that have occurred since late fall when mobilization was announced in Russia and when everyone thought that Russia would finally get serious about the war.
He says that while there was hope that this would happen and that a Rubicon-crossing moment had occurred, the Kremlin immediately did everything in its power to keep the status quo in place and not allow the country to mobilize for war seriously.
This is a rather alarming analysis with some good explanatory power behind it as well. An excerpt from the interview, translated:
Let’s get into the interesting points.
Streklov says that as soon as the situation was stabilized, the Kremlin put the brakes on again.
There are several aspects to what Strelkov is saying here. This halting effort is applied to both the battlefield and the home front and even the informational campaign that Russia is waging.
I have written extensively about the economic side of this before - Russia is not mobilizing for war on the home front. The economy has not been put on a war footing. There is a concerted effort to avoid nationalization of key efforts and reindustrialization. Instead, Russia continues to pursue a neo-austerity agenda under the watchful rule of Elvira Nabiullina. Here, it is impossible to say that the ministers are bad and the Czar is good seeing. asPutin re-appointed her earlier this year despite her very dubious loyalties and track record so far.
The simplest explanation for why this is occurring is that Russia’s oligarchs are terrified of losing control of their lucrative monopolies in the various raw mineral and manufacturing sectors of the economy, some of which are owned outright by a handful of gangsters from the 90s.
There are many pro-Russia voices out there that claim that Putin cleaned up the country when he took power and broke the power of the oligarchy. But nothing could be farther from the truth. Yes, Putin did indeed break the power of one rather notorious clique of ethnic oligarchs, many of whom, champions of Liberal Democracy all, sit now in exile in the West.
Putin earned that feather in his cap.
But he did NOT end the oligarchic post-Soviet structure of money and power in Russia.
All he did do was carve out a share for people that supported him and were amenable to keeping him and his friends in power. But gigantic formerly nationalized industries, built on the blood and sweat of peasants-turned-proles during the USSR are still in the hands of private monopolists who murdered their way into power in the 90s. Worse, these men line their pockets at levels far worse than the corruption seen among Soviet elites during the USSR days.
Thus, Putin has to take time out of his busy schedule to meet with Russia’s ammonia baron Dmitriy Mazepin and promise him that shipments to the West and Africa (but I repeat myself) will continue unhindered.
FT:
Kyiv and western capitals are loath to allow the Russian fertiliser sector to reap substantial export profits when sanctions are supposed to be crippling Russia’s economy, but they are under pressure to protect vulnerable countries from food and fertiliser shortages.
A deal thrashed out by Russia and Ukraine, via the UN, in Istanbul this summer and renewed last month opened the way for exports of Ukrainian grain blockaded by Russia’s invasion. The agreement included a pledge to restart exports of ammonia, a key ingredient in the production of nitrate fertilisers, Mazepin said. “I asked for help, through diplomatic channels, to once again revisit those agreements that were signed in Istanbul regarding the grain deal to open ammonia,” he said in an interview with the Financial Times, of a November meeting he had with Russian president Vladimir Putin.
Mazepin, founder and former majority owner of major Russian fertiliser producer Uralchem, outlined a proposal for a deal that concerns a pipeline connecting its TogliattiAzot plant to a Ukrainian port. The plan would involve a US or other non-Russian trading company, he said, “chosen from among the top three or four international traders”, purchasing ammonia in Russia and transporting it across Ukraine to the port of Odesa, where it would be shipped across the Black Sea. Mazepin said exports could start immediately, adding that about 80 per cent of output would head to African countries. “We are ready to resume pumping.” Mazepin, who chairs the fertiliser committee of Russia’s main oligarch talking shop, is seen as an increasingly influential figure after his meeting with Putin late last month.
Did you catch that?
A deal was made between Ukraine and Russia to ensure that grain and, eventually, some other commodities continue to flow out of Russia.
A deal implies give and take. Something was given in exchange for re-opening Russia’s access to markets. Do you know what that something was? Snake Island, of course. The legendary grave of Achilles. The island that was declared to be indefensible by the MoD and then surrendered to Ukraine. It has since been untouched and defensible. Well, whattaya know …
Do you see what Strelkov is getting at here? Backroom deals to keep Russian oligarchs satisfied take a backseat to military objectives and soldiers’ lives. In fact, military objectives appear to be being traded like playing cards with the West. The grain deal and Snake Island is the most egregious and cut and dried example of this behavior. But the return of the Azov death squads was almost certainly another such example. I’m not sure if Kherson’s surrender falls under this category, but there are some that say that it does.