The Russian Orthodox Church is Anti-Russian and Did Everything It Could to Overthrow the Tsars
Part I? The Secret Synod War Against "Caeseropapism".
I was finally prompted to start writing about the Orthodox Church’s role in Russia when a reader passed on an article about yet another gay sex scandal involving higher-ups in the Orthodox Church.
Yes, the infamous Metropolitan Hilarion got caught sexually harassing and grooming a young man over a period of several years. He was the second-in-command and the PR guy for the Church before getting caught in an FSB sting over alleged subversive activity and exiled to Hungary. You probably remember him for his declaration that the unvaxxed would go to Hell or something like that. Or maybe you remember the articles I wrote attacking him for being a Western spy and a traitor:
And:
Now, I personally knew that he was gay because Church people told me so years ago. So, this was well-known in Orthodox circles. But, well, somehow, the higher-ups didn’t know (lol sure) or more likely didn’t have a problem with it because a) the elites of the Church have always been gay and b) the other elites are homosexuals themselves.
If you are a fan of my Plato series on metaphysics, you will recall how I explain that theocracy is built around elite pedo cabals, as outlined by Plato in his proposed Utopia system which became the model for Christianity. So, extrapolating from theory, I knew that the Moscow Patriarchate had to be a gay pedo cabal before I even started looking for proofs.
You’d be surprised at how far learning political theory and studying the past can get you.
So, anyway, he got caught with a young Japanese man that he was grooming. Here:
« New Europe » managed to contact George, who told his story. We also received comments from Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeev).
Suzuki accuses Metropolitan Hilarion of sexual harassment. Hilarion, however, states that George is behind « a woman who calls herself his mother » and who tried to blackmail the Metropolitan, demanding compensation for the alleged moral damage to her son.
You can read the sordid details of his “love” affair on your own in the article.
I may cover other gay sex scandals involving high-ups in the very moral and traditional values Church if I choose to continue the series.
DISCLAIMER
I am not:
saying that any Western Church is better because they are not
saying that the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine are better because they are not
Religion was a mistake. I blame Plato and Aristotle for it.
OK and now let’s switch tracks to history. Today we are going to cover the Church involvement in the revolutionary movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. If there is interest in the series, we can go further back to the initial conquest of the Slavlands by these xenocrats, the later struggle for power with the Romanov Imperial government, and the role of Orthodoxy in the USSR.
The Orthodox Plot Against the Tsar
We are going to proceed out of order and we will simply start in the days leading up to and through the fateful overthrow of the Tsar. It is a popular misconception that the Church was somehow against the revolution. The literal opposite is true. The Church was heavily involved with all the main conspirators.
But there is nuance here.
The Reds were pure iconoclasts who were entirely anti-religion (in the beginning anyway) and they did indeed brutally destroy the Orthodox Church as an institution in the territories of the Russian Empire.
But the Whites were not quite as extreme. The Whites were the original revolutionaries who effected a coup against the Tsar in February. The Whites were then overthrown by the Reds. The Church sided with the Whites prior to the overthrow and continued to lend their support to them in the civil war that followed.
The Church Synod were actually the first to turn against the Tsar. They even went so far as to ritually depose the Tsar before he was even formally forced to abdicate. Why were they so against the Tsar? Well, there are several reason:
Theological: the Bible is clearly against the concept of kings and recommends theocratic oligarchy
Political: the Church believed that they could wrest more political power for themselves by deposing the Tsar
Ideological: the Church supported Socialism because they believed it to be the true Christian economic system and wanted to create a true Christian-Communist Theocratic state
Subversion: the Church was heavily represented at the higher levels by a foreign tribe with deep ethnic animus towards Slavs and always had this “problem” (not a bug, but a feature)
The key concept that we need to understand around which the animosity of the Orthodox Church to the Romanovs was built on is the accusation of Caesaropapism.
Here is what Orthodox Wiki says about it:
Caesaropapism is the idea of combining the power of secular government with, or making it superior to, the spiritual authority of the Christian Church; especially concerning the connection of the Christian Church with government. In its extreme form, it is a political theory in which the head of state, notably the Emperor ("Caesar," by extension an "equal" King), is also the supreme head of the church ("papa," pope or analogous religious leader). In this form, it inverts theocracy in which institutions of the Church are in control of the State.
So, the basic frame that I have presented in the past — that Christianity is inherently Theocratic and hostile to the rule of kings, is obviously true. In America, the ideological/theological justification for opposing the very concept of monarchy is based on Biblical fundamentalism as well.
Christians who deny this concept are simply in deep denial about their own religion.
One of the many Orthodox accusations hurled at Protestants is that their religion enabled the rise of Nationalism through national churches wedded to the power of secular state governments. Orthodoxy sees this as a bad thing because again, they are for global Theocracy, just like the Catholics.
After the introduction of Protestantism, the immense fermentation caused by the introduction of socially subversive principles into the life of a people would exhaust its revolutionary beginnings, and result in a new form of social and religious order—the residue of the great Protestant upheaval in Europe was territorial or State Religion, based on the religious supremacy of the temporal ruler, in contradistinction to the old order in which the temporal ruler took an oath of obedience to the Catholic Church.
It was the rise of Nationalism which eventually overthrew the power of Christianity, eventually rendering it a dead religion in Europe at least three centuries ago. The fact of the matter is that you do not need religion when you have nationalism. On the basis of nationalism, you can create moral codes, give people a higher purpose in life, and raise the overall quality of societal assabiyah in much the same way as with faith. In fact, I would argue that the historical record shows that Nationalism as a system is far superior in all regards. It was Nationalism that created the era of complete and overwhelming European state dominance over the entire rest of the world, which was still mired in either Feudalism or Theocracy (both forms of Oligarchy).
In Russia, the monarch who set Russia on the path to Imperial greatness was Ivan the Formidable, the absolute hands-down best ruler that Russia ever had, unless of course we factor in the semi-mythical demigod king-heroes of the ancient past. Ivan the Formidable even created the “Russian Idea” in the course of his debates with a Polish oligarch in which he railed against the political concept of Oligarchy and explained why it was the most unjust system to live under. Ivan the Formidable unabashedly laid down the foundations for Russian Nationalism and for that sacrilege, the Church has nursed a seething hatred of his legacy and for the Russian Way of government since then.
Caesaropapism's chief meaning is the authority the Byzantine emperors had over the Eastern Christian Church from the 500s through the tenth century.[1][2] The Byzantine emperor would typically protect the Eastern Church and manage its administration by presiding over councils and appointing patriarchs and setting territorial boundaries for their jurisdiction.[3] The emperor, whose control was so strong that "caesaropapism" became interchangeable with "Byzantinism," was called pontifex maximus, meaning chief priest, and the Patriarch of Constantinople could not hold office if he did not have the emperor's approval.[4] Eastern men like St. John Chrysostom, Patriarch of Constantinople[3] and Pope St. Athanasius, Patriarch of Alexandria, strongly opposed imperial control over the Church, as did Western theologians such as St. Hilary and Hosius, Bishop of Cardova.[5] Such emperors as Basilicus, Zeno, Justinian, Heraclius, and Constans II published several strictly ecclesiastical edicts either on their own without the mediation of church councils, or they exercised their own political influence on the councils to issue the edicts.[6]
Caesaropapism was most notorious in Russia when Ivan the Terrible assumed the title Czar in 1547 and subordinated the Russian Orthodox Church to the state.[7] This level of caesaropapism far exceeded that of the Byzantine Empire.[8] Caesaropapism existed in the Orthodox Church in Turkey until 1923 and in Cyprus until 1977, when Archbishop Makrios III reposed.[9] However, in no way is caesaropapism a part of Orthodox dogma. The historical reality, as opposed to doctrinal endorsement or dogmatic definition, of caesaropapism stems from, according to Metropolitan Kallistos Ware, the confusion of the Byzantine Empire with the Kingdom of God and the zeal of the Byzantines "to establish here on earth a living icon of God's government in heaven."[10]
So, now we should understand the conceptual framework that motivated Orthodox subversion directed against the Russian state.
It should come as little surprise then when we dig into the details of the Synod’s (Church government) treacherous behavior vis a vis the Tsar in the crucial days of unrest and revolution preceding the revolution.
Here is a good write-up of what they did:
– What was the political position of the hierarchs during the February Revolution?
– In the last days of February 1917 (I quote the dates according to the Julian calendar), in the conditions of a crisis of state power in the capital of the Russian Empire, there was an increase in the number of strikes and street demonstrations, which resulted in the treasonous defection of military units of the Petrograd garrison to the side of the Revolution. During those days, the Synod was urged to take any measures in support of the monarchy by both representatives of the public and government officials: for example, the Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, Nikolai Pavlovich Raev (1855-1919) and his deputy (more precisely, in the terminology of those years – comrade) Prince Nikolai Davidovich Zhevakhov (1874-1946). However, the members of the Synod did not meet those motions.
On March 2, 1917, in the chambers of the Moscow Metropolitan (they were located on the courtyard of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra, at 44, Fontanka River Embankment, in the building where the Mayor’s Central City Public Library is now located), a private meeting of the Synod members was held. Six of the eleven members of the supreme body of church administration took part in it. It was decided to immediately establish contact with the Provisional Government, formed that day by the Executive Committee of the State Duma. This fact allows us to argue that the members of the Synod recognized the new government even before (!) The abdication of Emperor Nicholas II from the throne, which took place on the night of March 2–3.
And then they continued to foment revolution by lying to the Russian people:
– During the February Revolution, the reigning dynasty was overthrown. How did the clergy of the Orthodox Church react to this event?
– Let’s do a little historical excursion. As you know, on March 2, 1917, in Pskov, Emperor Nicholas II renounced for himself and for his son in favor of his younger brother – Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. The following day, March 3, in Petrograd, in house No. 12 on Millionnaya Street, Mikhail Alexandrovich signed a document whose official name is the “Act on the refusal of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich from the acceptance of the supreme power and his recognition of the full power for the Provisional Government on the initiative of the State Duma ”(source: Collection of Legalizations and Decrees of the Government. Pg., 1917. No. 54. March 6. Sep. 1. Art. 345. S. 534.). However, in early March 1917 that document which was printed in the press, controlled by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers ‘and Soldiers’ Deputies, was published under the title “Abdication of Mikhail Alexandrovich.” It was from that point, that the myth spread about the abdication of the Grand Duke. At the same time, both the Petrograd Soviet, but also the Holy Synod were involved in the creation of this myth.
And then they finally pulled the trigger against the Romanov royal family:
Thus, on March 3, 1917, Russia was at a historic crossroads: to be a monarchy or a republic, in one form or another.
We come back to your question. How did the Holy Synod behave in this situation? In short, from March 4, it had taken a whole range of measures to remove the issue of the monarchy from the agenda in the socio-political consciousness of the 100 million Orthodox flock. For example, on March 7, the supreme body of church administration issued a definition in which it was prescribed to all Russian clergy: “in all cases, instead of commemoration of the reigning house, to offer prayers “for the God-Preserving Russian and Noble Interim Government” [the revolutionaries]. That is, on March 7, in the absence of the abdication of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich and before the decision of the Constituent Assembly on the form of government, the reigning House of Romanov began to be commemorated in the past tense. Thus, the members of the Synod intervened in the state system of Russia, and in this context, we can say that the members of the Synod overthrew royal power as an institution.
But I bet the “Orthobros” and “Putinboos” that are popular on the dissident internet now never told you about this little sordid chapter in the Church’s history, did they? They like to portray the Church as stalwart defenders of the Old Russia.
But nothing could be farther from the truth:
Thus, the thesis of the Petrosoviet about the alleged “abdication of Mikhail Alexandrovich” and, as a consequence, that the “House of Romanov abdicated” was supported by the authority of the Holy Synod, after which it was introduced into the public consciousness of the Orthodox flock, turning over time into an enduring myth. It is replicated to this day in contemporary scientific works and educational literature.
The laity don’t know about these historical truths or about the Church’s millennia old political ambitions. All they know is what their often equally clueless local priests tell them to believe. Pity the naive fools.
– How did the local clergy react to the February Revolution?
– The political line for the entire clergy was determined by the Synod. Its corresponding orders in the order of church administration from Petrograd were distributed to all dioceses, monasteries, and parishes. And the clergy, in turn, brought information to their parishioners. For example, after the changes made by the supreme body of church administration in liturgical ranks, prayers of the following plan began to sound in all the churches of the Russian Orthodox Church: With such “doctrinal” texts, the Synod actually proclaimed the thesis of the divine origin of the authority of the Provisional Government.
Yes, the government that had engaged in organized terrorism against the state and which was led by an Ethnic Revolutionary with ties to powerful bankers in the West, and who himself was a Freemason-Kabbalist [Kerensky], as was his inner circle, got the full-throated endorsement of the Church. It is another myth that they had no choice and had a bayonet put to their throats. This state of affairs came later, under the rule of the Reds. In that transitory period the Church had incredible power and was an active political ally of the Whites, before the Whites had even fully seized power.
This was a naked political power grab by subversive theocrats.
The actions taken by the Holy Synod in the spring of 1917 were due to motives arising from the centuries-old historical and theological problem of the “priesthood-tsardom,” the main question of which is the relationship between the tsarist and sacred hierarchical authorities, or whose authority is higher: the tsar or patriarch?
Taking advantage of the socio-political situation prevailing during the February Revolution, members of the Holy Synod decided to “settle accounts” with tsardom. Indeed, if there is tsarist power in the state in any form, then there is the participation of the emperor, as the anointed of God, in the affairs of church administration, there is a problem of correlation of priesthood and tsardom. If in the state there is no tsar, but there is a secular republic, devoid of sacred meaning in any form, then automatically it turns out that “the priesthood is higher than tsardom.”
In other words, in the early days of March 1917, members of the Holy Synod overthrew imperial power as their “charismatic competitor.” They wanted the church in the state to exist as if under the tsar, but without the tsar: in which the clergy, as before, would enjoy special rights and privileges, that it would receive subsidies from the treasury, but that there would be no “state interference in affairs church”, so that the clergy does not have any outside supervision, control and accountability.
Their first political act was to establish the Patriarchate, a kind of Pope-like position. Before that, they had operated under a Synod that was subordinate to Imperial authority. They elected Tikhon their first Patriarch, who was a Communist.
– The patriarchate was restored for the sake of the patriarchal power itself: first of all, so that it would be. Thus, the Local Council, under pressure from the “bishops’ party,” adopted the decision to restore the patriarchate on November 4, 1917, and the next day elected Metropolitan Tikhon of Moscow (Bellavin) [1] to the patriarchate. But at the same time, the powers of the first bishop and his place in the system of church administration were not delineated. Only on December 8, the Council adopted the definition “On the rights and obligations of His Holiness Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.” Further, the power of the patriarch only increased, right up to his absolutization in the 2000-2010s.
The current government in Russia is an Oligarchy. And, Putin and his spook state are linked at the hip with the Church. FSB agents go on special retreats with monks in places like Valaam in the far north of Russia. This should make sense because, again, if we consult the metapolitical theory that I expounded on in my book and on my essays on metaphysics and Plato and Nationalism, then we would know that the priesthood and the spookhood are the same thing.
This is an inescapable conclusion drawn from Perennialist thinking about politics and religion.
In general, speaking in the context of the problem of the “priesthood of the tsardom”, the year 1917 was reduced to the following: in March there was no royal authority, and in November the patriarchate appeared. That is, the tsar was gone, but the patriarch appeared. Who benefits from this? The question is rhetorical.
(…)
When Patriarch Tikhon learned of the vengeful execution of the Imperial Family in 1918, he commanded that Panikhidas (requiems) be served for Nicholas II as the slain Tsar—regardless of the fact that he abdicated the throne; regardless of the fact that under the Bolshevik terror this was dangerous for the Patriarch himself; regardless, finally, of the fact that ironically, it was the Tsarist government that had for two hundred years prevented the restoration of the Patriarchy in general, and would have prevented his becoming Patriarch in particular.
Tikhon was glorified (canonized) a saint by the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) on 1 November [O.S. 19 October] 1981. He was later glorified by the Moscow Patriarchate during the Bishop’s Council of 9–11 October 1989.
And that, dear readers, should be conclusive proof of all my claims about the true nature of the Orthodox project in Russia.
The final symbolic stroke was when the Church higher-ups all ceremonially carried out the Tsar’s chair from out of the Church and ritually dumped it, declaring that Caesaropapism had been defeated. It is very a similar episode (at least on the symbolic level) of the actual murder of Caesar by the Roman oligarchy and their assembly outside the Senate with their bloody knives declaring that the “tyrant” was dead.
The ritual murder of the king is an ancient occult ritual.
It is supposed to bestow great power on the cabal that pulls it off.
It is also a Perennial phenomenon.
…
Now let us explore some other key Church figures that sided with the ethnic revolutionaries at crucial moments in Imperial Russia’s history, eventually leading to the toppling of the monarchy and then the aristocracy and then the culture, the government, even territorial rearrangement to the detriment of Russian interests. There is no shortage of treacherous clergymen to choose from, but we will examine the most powerful and well-known subversives next.