“The first Khazar military putsch took place in 1917 in Petrograd. It’s obvious that the Khazars hadn’t disappeared; therefore, one ought to bear in mind that the military putsch in Petrograd in 1917 was organized by Khazar extremists, who made up an absolute majority in the war committees later known as “revolutionary”, in which [ethnic] Russians comprised less than one percent.
The Vatican, Protestant-Catholic Germany and Jewish extremists from Wall Street financed Lenin’s anti-Russian military putsch in Petrograd in 1917.
Germany’s goal was the defeat of its enemy on the Eastern Front. This was accomplished by the signing of the Brest Peace Agreement, which had negative consequences. The Vatican’s goal was the destruction of Orthodoxy, which it nearly accomplished.
The goal of the Jewish extremists was the creation of an anti-national government, in which the question of the Jewish state would be solved, as well as the establishment of monopolistic control over the enormous source of natural and human resources which Russia comprised, in the interests of its own enrichment…
…The Second Khazarian military putsch was carried out in 1993 in Moscow, when Khazar-Jewish extremists (who were carrying out extreme forms of economic transformation) took over the executive power, leading positions in the parties, including opposition ones, power over the mass-media and the banking system.”
While agreeing in principle with Bozidar Mitrovic’s conclusions, I’m at variance with him on a few details. For example, I consider the year 1991 to be the starting date in the history of the Third Khazaria, and the location of the putsch (not a military one, but nonetheless a putsch) to be the Belovezhsky Forest. [where the agreement dissolving the USSR was signed — Editor]
–from Bozidar Trifunov Mitrovic, “Genocide of the Romans and Slavs,” Moscow, BTM, 1999 "
Everyone talks about the petro dollar setup started in 1973 with Saudi Arabia, but they conveniently ignore that the US slyly also setup the Sinodollar at the same time. They build up China as a manufacturing hub to insure that its exports are also priced and paid for in dollars. This is the reason why China always pretends to be going "multipolar" but never seems to get there. Now you know, so enjoy the show.
I don't see it that way. There are plenty of suppliers who accept payment in CNY (RMB) and many who prefer it. On one occasion, I was even asked to pay in euros. Understandable, since euro transfers always seem to proceed rapidly and smoothly, whereas USD telegraphic transfers often get delayed for weeks or even dropped entirely for no reason. RMB payments are best of all, since they can be sent from wechat to wechat instantly. So in my experience, USD is usually used as a pricing mechanism because it's universally understood and as a settlement mechanism because everyone has some way to send it.
Whats the US pay China in ? England ? France ? Poland ? etc .................
and You proved my point with this statement:
" So in my experience, USD is usually used as a pricing mechanism because it's universally understood and as a settlement mechanism because everyone has some way to send it. "
Yes, it was very "convenient" for the US to setup that trap. It was always a trap.
1) First they got off the gold standard.
2) Then they established the petro dollar
3) Then the Sindollar.
This allowed the US to have full control over all transactions via SWIFT and gave them sanctions power over other nations. It also allowed for the US to print endless money while controlling domestic inflation by having Dollars being constantly shipped overseas, further trapping the nations holding them. This allowed the US to support a massive, modern military to dominate the planet , and here we are.
China agreed to the deal for the same reason Saudi Arabia did, it made them rich, but now both are trapped as is the rest of the world.
Also, the whole notion that other nations cant figure out an alternative payment system to the 70s era swift is absurd. They're all playing frightened fools. Nothing physical ever gets transferred its all just 0's and 1's , yet they cant figure out a way . Not buying it.
Not to mention they all have central banks that print money at interest, thats a dead give away that they are all under control already.
Russian Arms Exports Collapse by 92 Percent as Military-Industrial Complex Fails
John C. K. Daly
Executive Summary:
Russia’s arms exports dropped by 92 percent from 2021 to 2024 due to redirected resources for Ukraine, sanctions, inflation, and funding issues.
The number of countries purchasing Russian arms has dropped dramatically. Major customers such as India have shown caution or shifted to competitors such as the People’s Republic of China.
Russia has been promoting its Su-57E stealth fighter, emphasizing combat experience in Ukraine, but faces setbacks such as poor international sales and buyer reluctance. Despite challenges, Moscow is focusing on domestic contracts.
As Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” (SVO) against Ukraine approaches its third year, its casualties increasingly include Russian arms exports, traditionally the economy’s second largest export earner after energy. By the end of 2024, Russian arms exports decreased fourteenfold from their levels in 2021 by 92 percent to less than $1 billion (Arbat Media, November 30, 2024). In 2021, before the full-scale invasion began, Russian arms exports generated $14.6 billion; in 2022, $8 billion; and in 2023, $3 billion. The most significant factor behind the reduction in exports is the redistribution of resources for domestic needs, as Russia’s military-industrial complex’s top priority is now equipping its own armed forces during its military conflict with Ukraine (see EDM, October 3, 2024).
In March 2023, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that Russia, for the first time, dropped to third place in the ranking of the largest exporters of military equipment, behind the U.S. and France. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Germany are in fourth and fifth place in the world in arms exports, respectively. SIPRI reported that the Russian Federation exported 53 percent fewer weapons in 2019–2023 than in 2014–2018 (RIA Novosti, November 3, 2024).
The market for Russian armaments have declined from thirty-one countries in 2019 to just twelve in 2024 despite Russia continuing to work with major customers such as the PRC, Myanmar, and India. High interest rates, now 21 percent, further aggravate the market and impact the future of Russian defense manufacturers. In an ironic development, many previous customers have turned to the PRC, leaving the question of whether Russia can regain its market share.
Rosoboronexport General Director and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Engineering Union Aleksandr Mikheev maintains that there are no problems, commenting, “The contract documents signed by Rosoboronexport since the beginning of 2024 for products for all branches of the armed forces, as well as civilian solutions in the interests of the armed forces and other law enforcement agencies of our partners, have allowed the company to keep the portfolio of orders at a record level of $55 billion.” Mikheev added that the production capacities currently available in Russia after fulfilling the state’s priority defense order, the sector’s excess capacity allows Rosoboronexport to fulfill completely its export contracts (RIA Novosti, December 27, 2024). Mikheev added, “Rosoboronexport’s order book at the end of 2024 reached a record in the company’s history … providing for the supply of Russian military products to 44 countries of the world” (Life.ru, December 28, 2024).
The previous month, Rosoboronexport announced that it had signed the first contracts with unnamed clients for Russian fifth-generation Su-57E fighters, the flagship of Russian combat aviation and of “great interest” to foreign customers (Life.ru, November 13, 2024). Only three countries currently produce fifth-generation stealth fighters—the PRC, the United States, and Russia. Mikheev also stressed that an advantage that the SU-57 had over other 5th-generation fighters in the global arms market is that it had acquired real-time combat experience during Russia’s “special military operation” (SVO) against Ukraine, where it demonstrated its effectiveness in countering American Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems and other Western air defense systems deployed there as well as operating in Syria.
The Sukhoi Design Bureau, part of the United Aircraft Corporation, developed the Su-57. The aircraft is produced in Siberia’s Komsomolsk-on-Amur Sukhoi Aviation Plant (KnAAZ). The Su-57’s first flight took place on January 29, 2010, but it was only a decade later, at the end of 2020, that the Russian Armed Forces received their first serial Su-57 (Trud, November 13, 2024). Interestingly, the year before the first Su-57s were delivered to the Russian armed forces, Russia’s then-Deputy Prime Minister for the Military-Industrial Complex, Yury Borisov, remarked the government was considering exporting the aircraft to “strategic partners” once indigenous needs were met (Tsar’grad Television Channel, June 12, 2019). In August 2020, Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation said that several countries had already sent official applications to purchase Su-57 aircraft (RT Television Channel, November 2, 2020).
Undoubtedly tempering Mikheev’s enthusiastic sales pitches was Rosoboronexport’s earlier lackluster performance at the prestigious November 13–17 Dubai Airshow 2023. Unlike previous years, when the company announced multibillion-dollar deals, no contracts were signed this time, despite Rosoboronexport again offering potential customers the Su-57E (Novorosinform, November 22, 2024). The following year, the Su-57E flew at the PRC’s Zhuhai Air Show, where on November 12, it made its premier display flight for foreign observers (TASS, November 13, 2024). While the Russian government waits for SU-57 orders to flood in, Sukhoi’s KnAAZ facility will be busy fulfilling its state contract, which was concluded in 2019. The contract projects that by 2028, 76 Su-57 fighters will enter the Russian service (Mil.Press Voennoe RF, February 20, 2021).
India, a major market for Russian arms, is displaying caution about purchasing the SU-57 under its 2018 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program, intended to purchase 114 new fighters for the Indian Air Force (IAF). Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retired), when asked whether Saab’s leading contender Gripen-E would be the best for the IAF, which considers Pakistan and the PRC as its prime potential adversaries, replied,
"I recommend going for the already tested and inducted Rafale aircraft (in phases). Adding another type of aircraft will add to the already diverse inventory. Most contenders offer the listed benefits (Transfer of Technology, Made in India, etc.). The extent of these offers needs to be assessed. However, go in for the Gripen if the deal is lucrative and provides maximum bang for the buck" (The Eurasian Times, December 16, 2024).
Khosla notably did not mention any Russian aircraft.
A new era of Russian arms exports began after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s post-Soviet economic situation was so deplorable that any military equipment for which foreigners were willing to pay was sold, the only exceptions being nuclear munitions and their means of delivery. Similarly, as a former pillar of Russia’s export “hard currency” earners, the Russian government is seeking not only to staunch its decline in armaments exports but also increase them, dangling the Su-57 as cutting-edge technology equivalent to the best Western weaponry. A number of deepening problems are unfortunately complicating Rosoboronexport’s reentry to the global armaments trade, including SVO priority commitments, inflation, funding and payment issues, sanctions, and corruption, a skein of difficulties making the war against Ukraine seem simple by comparison.
Since no 'important person with a small hat' is being harmed, these attacks don't matter. The only people being killed are disposable cattle. Only the 'small hat people' matter. 'Leaders' exist to embody the lies being told by the 'small hat people', not to do anything for non-small-hat-people.
Non-small-hat-people unite!
You have nothing to lose, not even your lives (which are already owned by the small-hat-people via 'patriotism').
You would be too, if no one ever put a resistance to your devious, underhanded schemes. They must think we're stupid, impotent fools. Maybe they're right.
Even those thing that appear to be 'written in stone' are simply written in stone, and stone wears just the same as everything else. Any old graveyard will attest to this being the case. Anti-Semites are the acid rain that dissolves the words 'jews are the chosen' from the stone upon which it is written.
Off topic: Why is it we don't talk about our friend Luka any more - fondly remembered for his no-lockdown (if not, no vax) defiance during the "pandemic".
DC neocons are up to their old fear mongering tricks:
"The Kremlin is in the endgame of a decades’ long strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus —"
The West is incapable of abiding by a treaty so if the Kremlin agrees to one, sooner or later that will turn against Russians because "the exceptional / chosen" people consider themselves already "owners of the cosmos" IOW act as they please with impunity even against vassals &"allies".
AFAIK only the Chinese leadership understands the issue and recently developed a 6th generation warplane, not meant for defense but to defeat what otherwise will be the 4ever enemy, draining crucial nonrenewable resources in a never ending arms race.
A notorious KLA merc now doing logistics in Ukraine shares his thoughts:
Profile photo for Roland Bartetzko
Roland Bartetzko
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Logistics in Ukraine (2022–present)Jan 4
Why did Ukraine’s new 155th Mechanized Brigade completely disintegrate before reaching the front lines? Were there flaws in the French and Polish training, the brigade’s leadership, or poor morale?
The problem with this brigade was the same as with all newly established Ukrainian army brigades.
The entire concept of creating new brigades (instead of strengthening the already existing ones) is, to put it mildly, not a good idea.
In the Western media, it was reported that this brigade was disbanded primarily due to high desertion rates, but this is not accurate.
In reality, 50 of its 6,000 soldiers disappeared during training in France. While regrettable, this is a relatively small number and had no significant impact on the brigade’s performance.
Most of the other soldiers who left the brigade joined already established and experienced units, which is understandable.
The 155th Brigade had very few combat-experienced veterans in its ranks—less than 5%. Deploying such a unit into combat, even when equipped with modern Western weapons, is utterly irresponsible.
When this brigade was sent to the battlefield, it was deployed in the Pokrovsk direction, where the heaviest fighting is taking place. It would have been far more prudent to first assign them to a quieter sector to acclimate the soldiers to being under fire. This was a grave mistake.
Furthermore, the unit arrived in Pokrovsk without drones or electronic warfare equipment (e.g., jammers), rendering them practically incapable of operating. This goes beyond a simple mistake, it amounts to criminal negligence. Whoever was responsible for this must be held accountable.
Unfortunately, what happened with the 155th Brigade is not an isolated incident. The entire strategy of forming new battalions and brigades while existing units remain severely understrength is deeply flawed.
What the generals of the Armed Forces did may look good on paper (“Look, we now have 10% more brigades!”), but in reality, leaving established units depleted and sending inexperienced troops into combat is a recipe for disaster.
One can only hope that the political-military leadership will wake up and finally listens to those who already warned of these developments many months ago.
It is difficult to see how the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyy, can remain in his position. He should be fired.
Moscow’s Plans for Trade Corridor with Iran Faces Ever More Problems
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
Since becoming the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin has made developing a north-south trade corridor a centerpiece of his geoeconomic and geopolitical program. This would counter the impact of east-west routes and align the global south against the West.
He has now declared this corridor the foundation of a new strategic alliance with Iran, one designed to help him with his war against Ukraine, which disturbed many in the West as a sign that he will be able to end-run sanctions and overturn the current global order.
The much-ballyhooed plans for a trade corridor between Russia and Iran face many problems. They are unlikely to be realized until the next decade unless Western sanctions end and outside investment flows in to fund this project.
Twenty-five years ago, with great fanfare, Russia and Iran signed an agreement to open a north-south intermodal transportation corridor between Russia in the north and the Indian Ocean in the south. Progress has been slow, however, and is unlikely to accelerate anytime soon, Russian analysts say on this anniversary. This conclusion is in striking, sharp contrast to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s and Iranian leaders’ boosterism this month and to Western fears about what the development of this route will mean for international relations (“Kaspiskii Vestnik”, January 5). The economic benefits Russia and Iran would obtain if this route became fully operational are abundant, so concerns about that development explain why many Western commentaries are increasingly alarmist. Problems with the route include the politics of the countries between Russia and Iran, the topographic difficulties involved in building it, and the shortage of funds to construct both intermodal transit points and rail lines. These all mean, as Russian analysts acknowledge, that the corridor is not going to be fully operational until sometime in the 2030s unless the West ends its sanctions regime against Moscow and allows the influx of investments that might give Russia and Iran a victory on what is a critical front for both.
Progress toward the completion of this corridor over the last two decades has been slow despite Putin’s commitment to the construction of a north-south transit corridor and the support he has received from Iran and, to a lesser extent, India and other South Asian countries. There simply are not enough rail and sea lanes in place either north or south of what was once the Soviet border for the situation to be otherwise, the topography of the area makes building new routes extremely difficult and expensive, and the shifting politics of the countries in between has forced Moscow to keep changing its plans for where the corridor will run from west of the Caspian to east to the Caspian Sea itself (see EDM, September 1, 2015, February 26, 2019, February 22, 2021, January 4, 2023, April 11, 2023, August 8, 2023, 2023).
Moreover, the development of the route in Iran has faced serious problems. Not only are its rail lines of a different gauge than those of Russia and the other post-Soviet states, but Iran has few rail lines at all in the north and thus cannot handle the trade that Russia wants to make the corridor fully operational. Iran has announced plans for nine strategic railway corridors to overcome these problems, but it lacks the funds to do so on its own (Eurasia Today, January 9). Russia’s war in Ukraine and sanctions have compromised Russia’s ability to assist it, and its dependence on China is also undercutting Tehran’s commitment to building the north-south corridor, as Beijing has a different agenda than Moscow as far as routes are concerned (see EDM, February 22, 2021, May 16, 2022). Unless sanctions against both Russia and Iran are lifted, the financing needed for this project is unlikely to come from the West.
Leaders of Russia and Iran continue to speak as if the route were already fully functioning because of the advantages that the completion of the north-south route would bring both Moscow and Tehran. Those statements, along with the shipment of Iranian arms north to Russia, have driven Western alarm. (For a useful recent survey of the former, which clearly are the reasons for the latter, see “Kaspiskii Vestnik”, December 2, 2024.) That pattern makes the correction offered by Aleksey Sidelnnikov, a Russian specialist on the Caucasus and its transportation routes, especially important (“Kaspiskii Vestnik”, January 5). After surveying what both Moscow and Iran have said over the past 25 years about the corridor as compared to what has actually happened, he suggests that it is critically important to recognize that the claims have often outrun the realities.
That pattern, he suggests, is likely to continue given the importance of the corridor once completed and the difficulties Moscow and Tehran are now facing and will likely continue to face in the next decade. Sidelnikov points to five difficulties that he says are almost certain to constitute obstacles to achieving what Moscow and Tehran hope for:
First, sanctions and the geopolitical tensions that have produced them. These trends mean that outside funds are unlikely to become available and that both Moscow and Tehran will be unable to come up with more money on their own because of their other commitments, including rising tensions between the two and the West;
Second, unresolved differences among the partners in the corridor project over its routing, especially over which country will build what on the territories of others. This has already delayed construction in northwestern Iran;
Third, the lack of existing infrastructure in both Russia and Iran and in the countries in between. This shortage involves not only the rail mainlines but feeder routes and intermodal transfer stations as well;
Fourth, the failure of the two sides and their partners in between to come up with a single tariff policy or even agreements on the harmonization of border procedures. These all slow the flow of goods and hence the importance for the participants in completing the corridor infrastructure; and
Fifth, growing concerns in these countries and others further afield about the environmental impact of the corridor. These concerns may seem small now but are growing as ever more of the trade planned shifts from land to the Caspian Sea, which is already suffering from serious environmental degradation and as Iran copes with water shortages and a burgeoning population in its ethnically fractious northwestern provinces (see EDM, November 16, 2023).
None of these problems by themself or even all of them together means that Moscow and Tehran will not be able to complete the corridor at some point. They suggest, however, three important caveats for the West to take into consideration. First, Moscow’s claims about the corridor are just that, claims rather than realities, and should be treated as such. Second, the problems that Moscow and Tehran face in this area are increasing rather than decreasing, and consequently, even today’s projected completion dates in the next decade should be treated with skepticism. Third, and by far the most important, as long as the West keeps sanctions against Russia for its war in Ukraine and Iran for its nuclear program and support for terrorism in place, Moscow and Tehran are unlikely to be able to achieve the breakthrough with the north-south corridor against the West they hope for anytime soon if at all.
- Moscow and Kiev hold ‘limited talks’ – Bloomberg
The two sides are reportedly working on an arrangement that would shield nuclear facilities from being targeted -
" Moscow has repeatedly stated that it is ready for peace talks at any moment without any preconditions other than those agreed upon in Istanbul in 2022. "
Debris, the most devastating weapons of all.
All nations need to stock up on Debris missiles. Those suckers are deadly ;)
"
“The first Khazar military putsch took place in 1917 in Petrograd. It’s obvious that the Khazars hadn’t disappeared; therefore, one ought to bear in mind that the military putsch in Petrograd in 1917 was organized by Khazar extremists, who made up an absolute majority in the war committees later known as “revolutionary”, in which [ethnic] Russians comprised less than one percent.
The Vatican, Protestant-Catholic Germany and Jewish extremists from Wall Street financed Lenin’s anti-Russian military putsch in Petrograd in 1917.
Germany’s goal was the defeat of its enemy on the Eastern Front. This was accomplished by the signing of the Brest Peace Agreement, which had negative consequences. The Vatican’s goal was the destruction of Orthodoxy, which it nearly accomplished.
The goal of the Jewish extremists was the creation of an anti-national government, in which the question of the Jewish state would be solved, as well as the establishment of monopolistic control over the enormous source of natural and human resources which Russia comprised, in the interests of its own enrichment…
…The Second Khazarian military putsch was carried out in 1993 in Moscow, when Khazar-Jewish extremists (who were carrying out extreme forms of economic transformation) took over the executive power, leading positions in the parties, including opposition ones, power over the mass-media and the banking system.”
While agreeing in principle with Bozidar Mitrovic’s conclusions, I’m at variance with him on a few details. For example, I consider the year 1991 to be the starting date in the history of the Third Khazaria, and the location of the putsch (not a military one, but nonetheless a putsch) to be the Belovezhsky Forest. [where the agreement dissolving the USSR was signed — Editor]
–from Bozidar Trifunov Mitrovic, “Genocide of the Romans and Slavs,” Moscow, BTM, 1999 "
https://christiansfortruth.com/how-chabad-jews-orchestrated-ukraine-war-to-establish-their-third-khazaria-kingdom/
Everyone talks about the petro dollar setup started in 1973 with Saudi Arabia, but they conveniently ignore that the US slyly also setup the Sinodollar at the same time. They build up China as a manufacturing hub to insure that its exports are also priced and paid for in dollars. This is the reason why China always pretends to be going "multipolar" but never seems to get there. Now you know, so enjoy the show.
I don't see it that way. There are plenty of suppliers who accept payment in CNY (RMB) and many who prefer it. On one occasion, I was even asked to pay in euros. Understandable, since euro transfers always seem to proceed rapidly and smoothly, whereas USD telegraphic transfers often get delayed for weeks or even dropped entirely for no reason. RMB payments are best of all, since they can be sent from wechat to wechat instantly. So in my experience, USD is usually used as a pricing mechanism because it's universally understood and as a settlement mechanism because everyone has some way to send it.
Whats the US pay China in ? England ? France ? Poland ? etc .................
and You proved my point with this statement:
" So in my experience, USD is usually used as a pricing mechanism because it's universally understood and as a settlement mechanism because everyone has some way to send it. "
Your point seems to be that it's political. My assertion is that it's just convenience and inertia.
Yes, it was very "convenient" for the US to setup that trap. It was always a trap.
1) First they got off the gold standard.
2) Then they established the petro dollar
3) Then the Sindollar.
This allowed the US to have full control over all transactions via SWIFT and gave them sanctions power over other nations. It also allowed for the US to print endless money while controlling domestic inflation by having Dollars being constantly shipped overseas, further trapping the nations holding them. This allowed the US to support a massive, modern military to dominate the planet , and here we are.
China agreed to the deal for the same reason Saudi Arabia did, it made them rich, but now both are trapped as is the rest of the world.
Also, the whole notion that other nations cant figure out an alternative payment system to the 70s era swift is absurd. They're all playing frightened fools. Nothing physical ever gets transferred its all just 0's and 1's , yet they cant figure out a way . Not buying it.
Not to mention they all have central banks that print money at interest, thats a dead give away that they are all under control already.
Weren't all the ATACMS wiped out as soon as they crossed the Ukraine border?
Russian Arms Exports Collapse by 92 Percent as Military-Industrial Complex Fails
John C. K. Daly
Executive Summary:
Russia’s arms exports dropped by 92 percent from 2021 to 2024 due to redirected resources for Ukraine, sanctions, inflation, and funding issues.
The number of countries purchasing Russian arms has dropped dramatically. Major customers such as India have shown caution or shifted to competitors such as the People’s Republic of China.
Russia has been promoting its Su-57E stealth fighter, emphasizing combat experience in Ukraine, but faces setbacks such as poor international sales and buyer reluctance. Despite challenges, Moscow is focusing on domestic contracts.
As Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” (SVO) against Ukraine approaches its third year, its casualties increasingly include Russian arms exports, traditionally the economy’s second largest export earner after energy. By the end of 2024, Russian arms exports decreased fourteenfold from their levels in 2021 by 92 percent to less than $1 billion (Arbat Media, November 30, 2024). In 2021, before the full-scale invasion began, Russian arms exports generated $14.6 billion; in 2022, $8 billion; and in 2023, $3 billion. The most significant factor behind the reduction in exports is the redistribution of resources for domestic needs, as Russia’s military-industrial complex’s top priority is now equipping its own armed forces during its military conflict with Ukraine (see EDM, October 3, 2024).
In March 2023, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that Russia, for the first time, dropped to third place in the ranking of the largest exporters of military equipment, behind the U.S. and France. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Germany are in fourth and fifth place in the world in arms exports, respectively. SIPRI reported that the Russian Federation exported 53 percent fewer weapons in 2019–2023 than in 2014–2018 (RIA Novosti, November 3, 2024).
The market for Russian armaments have declined from thirty-one countries in 2019 to just twelve in 2024 despite Russia continuing to work with major customers such as the PRC, Myanmar, and India. High interest rates, now 21 percent, further aggravate the market and impact the future of Russian defense manufacturers. In an ironic development, many previous customers have turned to the PRC, leaving the question of whether Russia can regain its market share.
Rosoboronexport General Director and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Engineering Union Aleksandr Mikheev maintains that there are no problems, commenting, “The contract documents signed by Rosoboronexport since the beginning of 2024 for products for all branches of the armed forces, as well as civilian solutions in the interests of the armed forces and other law enforcement agencies of our partners, have allowed the company to keep the portfolio of orders at a record level of $55 billion.” Mikheev added that the production capacities currently available in Russia after fulfilling the state’s priority defense order, the sector’s excess capacity allows Rosoboronexport to fulfill completely its export contracts (RIA Novosti, December 27, 2024). Mikheev added, “Rosoboronexport’s order book at the end of 2024 reached a record in the company’s history … providing for the supply of Russian military products to 44 countries of the world” (Life.ru, December 28, 2024).
The previous month, Rosoboronexport announced that it had signed the first contracts with unnamed clients for Russian fifth-generation Su-57E fighters, the flagship of Russian combat aviation and of “great interest” to foreign customers (Life.ru, November 13, 2024). Only three countries currently produce fifth-generation stealth fighters—the PRC, the United States, and Russia. Mikheev also stressed that an advantage that the SU-57 had over other 5th-generation fighters in the global arms market is that it had acquired real-time combat experience during Russia’s “special military operation” (SVO) against Ukraine, where it demonstrated its effectiveness in countering American Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems and other Western air defense systems deployed there as well as operating in Syria.
The Sukhoi Design Bureau, part of the United Aircraft Corporation, developed the Su-57. The aircraft is produced in Siberia’s Komsomolsk-on-Amur Sukhoi Aviation Plant (KnAAZ). The Su-57’s first flight took place on January 29, 2010, but it was only a decade later, at the end of 2020, that the Russian Armed Forces received their first serial Su-57 (Trud, November 13, 2024). Interestingly, the year before the first Su-57s were delivered to the Russian armed forces, Russia’s then-Deputy Prime Minister for the Military-Industrial Complex, Yury Borisov, remarked the government was considering exporting the aircraft to “strategic partners” once indigenous needs were met (Tsar’grad Television Channel, June 12, 2019). In August 2020, Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation said that several countries had already sent official applications to purchase Su-57 aircraft (RT Television Channel, November 2, 2020).
Undoubtedly tempering Mikheev’s enthusiastic sales pitches was Rosoboronexport’s earlier lackluster performance at the prestigious November 13–17 Dubai Airshow 2023. Unlike previous years, when the company announced multibillion-dollar deals, no contracts were signed this time, despite Rosoboronexport again offering potential customers the Su-57E (Novorosinform, November 22, 2024). The following year, the Su-57E flew at the PRC’s Zhuhai Air Show, where on November 12, it made its premier display flight for foreign observers (TASS, November 13, 2024). While the Russian government waits for SU-57 orders to flood in, Sukhoi’s KnAAZ facility will be busy fulfilling its state contract, which was concluded in 2019. The contract projects that by 2028, 76 Su-57 fighters will enter the Russian service (Mil.Press Voennoe RF, February 20, 2021).
India, a major market for Russian arms, is displaying caution about purchasing the SU-57 under its 2018 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program, intended to purchase 114 new fighters for the Indian Air Force (IAF). Air Marshal Anil Khosla (retired), when asked whether Saab’s leading contender Gripen-E would be the best for the IAF, which considers Pakistan and the PRC as its prime potential adversaries, replied,
"I recommend going for the already tested and inducted Rafale aircraft (in phases). Adding another type of aircraft will add to the already diverse inventory. Most contenders offer the listed benefits (Transfer of Technology, Made in India, etc.). The extent of these offers needs to be assessed. However, go in for the Gripen if the deal is lucrative and provides maximum bang for the buck" (The Eurasian Times, December 16, 2024).
Khosla notably did not mention any Russian aircraft.
A new era of Russian arms exports began after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s post-Soviet economic situation was so deplorable that any military equipment for which foreigners were willing to pay was sold, the only exceptions being nuclear munitions and their means of delivery. Similarly, as a former pillar of Russia’s export “hard currency” earners, the Russian government is seeking not only to staunch its decline in armaments exports but also increase them, dangling the Su-57 as cutting-edge technology equivalent to the best Western weaponry. A number of deepening problems are unfortunately complicating Rosoboronexport’s reentry to the global armaments trade, including SVO priority commitments, inflation, funding and payment issues, sanctions, and corruption, a skein of difficulties making the war against Ukraine seem simple by comparison.
Since no 'important person with a small hat' is being harmed, these attacks don't matter. The only people being killed are disposable cattle. Only the 'small hat people' matter. 'Leaders' exist to embody the lies being told by the 'small hat people', not to do anything for non-small-hat-people.
Non-small-hat-people unite!
You have nothing to lose, not even your lives (which are already owned by the small-hat-people via 'patriotism').
" 'important person with a small hat' "
Oy Vey !!! I'm offended good sir, this is a virtual shoah ? The proper term is " Happy Merchants ".
They really seem all that happy to me. But I'm sure they're 'important' because, in the end, everyone must give way to them.
You would be too, if no one ever put a resistance to your devious, underhanded schemes. They must think we're stupid, impotent fools. Maybe they're right.
Even those thing that appear to be 'written in stone' are simply written in stone, and stone wears just the same as everything else. Any old graveyard will attest to this being the case. Anti-Semites are the acid rain that dissolves the words 'jews are the chosen' from the stone upon which it is written.
It better start raining soon as the gates are closing fast.
Off topic: Why is it we don't talk about our friend Luka any more - fondly remembered for his no-lockdown (if not, no vax) defiance during the "pandemic".
DC neocons are up to their old fear mongering tricks:
"The Kremlin is in the endgame of a decades’ long strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus —"
Say it ain't so Luka! or Rurik?
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus
Actions speak louder than words, as they say:
https://x.com/vick55top/status/1879244463228518882
Victor vickop55 commentary
@vick55top
A large-scale transfer of ammunition from the US to Rzeszow, Poland is underway: transport planes are arriving almost one after another
#vicktop55
8:09 AM · Jan 15, 2025
The West is incapable of abiding by a treaty so if the Kremlin agrees to one, sooner or later that will turn against Russians because "the exceptional / chosen" people consider themselves already "owners of the cosmos" IOW act as they please with impunity even against vassals &"allies".
AFAIK only the Chinese leadership understands the issue and recently developed a 6th generation warplane, not meant for defense but to defeat what otherwise will be the 4ever enemy, draining crucial nonrenewable resources in a never ending arms race.
A notorious KLA merc now doing logistics in Ukraine shares his thoughts:
Profile photo for Roland Bartetzko
Roland Bartetzko
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Logistics in Ukraine (2022–present)Jan 4
Why did Ukraine’s new 155th Mechanized Brigade completely disintegrate before reaching the front lines? Were there flaws in the French and Polish training, the brigade’s leadership, or poor morale?
The problem with this brigade was the same as with all newly established Ukrainian army brigades.
The entire concept of creating new brigades (instead of strengthening the already existing ones) is, to put it mildly, not a good idea.
In the Western media, it was reported that this brigade was disbanded primarily due to high desertion rates, but this is not accurate.
In reality, 50 of its 6,000 soldiers disappeared during training in France. While regrettable, this is a relatively small number and had no significant impact on the brigade’s performance.
Most of the other soldiers who left the brigade joined already established and experienced units, which is understandable.
The 155th Brigade had very few combat-experienced veterans in its ranks—less than 5%. Deploying such a unit into combat, even when equipped with modern Western weapons, is utterly irresponsible.
When this brigade was sent to the battlefield, it was deployed in the Pokrovsk direction, where the heaviest fighting is taking place. It would have been far more prudent to first assign them to a quieter sector to acclimate the soldiers to being under fire. This was a grave mistake.
Furthermore, the unit arrived in Pokrovsk without drones or electronic warfare equipment (e.g., jammers), rendering them practically incapable of operating. This goes beyond a simple mistake, it amounts to criminal negligence. Whoever was responsible for this must be held accountable.
Unfortunately, what happened with the 155th Brigade is not an isolated incident. The entire strategy of forming new battalions and brigades while existing units remain severely understrength is deeply flawed.
What the generals of the Armed Forces did may look good on paper (“Look, we now have 10% more brigades!”), but in reality, leaving established units depleted and sending inexperienced troops into combat is a recipe for disaster.
One can only hope that the political-military leadership will wake up and finally listens to those who already warned of these developments many months ago.
It is difficult to see how the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyy, can remain in his position. He should be fired.
https://open.substack.com/pub/korybko/p/the-merits-of-a-demilitarized-trans?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=o786d
Moscow’s Plans for Trade Corridor with Iran Faces Ever More Problems
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
Since becoming the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin has made developing a north-south trade corridor a centerpiece of his geoeconomic and geopolitical program. This would counter the impact of east-west routes and align the global south against the West.
He has now declared this corridor the foundation of a new strategic alliance with Iran, one designed to help him with his war against Ukraine, which disturbed many in the West as a sign that he will be able to end-run sanctions and overturn the current global order.
The much-ballyhooed plans for a trade corridor between Russia and Iran face many problems. They are unlikely to be realized until the next decade unless Western sanctions end and outside investment flows in to fund this project.
Twenty-five years ago, with great fanfare, Russia and Iran signed an agreement to open a north-south intermodal transportation corridor between Russia in the north and the Indian Ocean in the south. Progress has been slow, however, and is unlikely to accelerate anytime soon, Russian analysts say on this anniversary. This conclusion is in striking, sharp contrast to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s and Iranian leaders’ boosterism this month and to Western fears about what the development of this route will mean for international relations (“Kaspiskii Vestnik”, January 5). The economic benefits Russia and Iran would obtain if this route became fully operational are abundant, so concerns about that development explain why many Western commentaries are increasingly alarmist. Problems with the route include the politics of the countries between Russia and Iran, the topographic difficulties involved in building it, and the shortage of funds to construct both intermodal transit points and rail lines. These all mean, as Russian analysts acknowledge, that the corridor is not going to be fully operational until sometime in the 2030s unless the West ends its sanctions regime against Moscow and allows the influx of investments that might give Russia and Iran a victory on what is a critical front for both.
Progress toward the completion of this corridor over the last two decades has been slow despite Putin’s commitment to the construction of a north-south transit corridor and the support he has received from Iran and, to a lesser extent, India and other South Asian countries. There simply are not enough rail and sea lanes in place either north or south of what was once the Soviet border for the situation to be otherwise, the topography of the area makes building new routes extremely difficult and expensive, and the shifting politics of the countries in between has forced Moscow to keep changing its plans for where the corridor will run from west of the Caspian to east to the Caspian Sea itself (see EDM, September 1, 2015, February 26, 2019, February 22, 2021, January 4, 2023, April 11, 2023, August 8, 2023, 2023).
Moreover, the development of the route in Iran has faced serious problems. Not only are its rail lines of a different gauge than those of Russia and the other post-Soviet states, but Iran has few rail lines at all in the north and thus cannot handle the trade that Russia wants to make the corridor fully operational. Iran has announced plans for nine strategic railway corridors to overcome these problems, but it lacks the funds to do so on its own (Eurasia Today, January 9). Russia’s war in Ukraine and sanctions have compromised Russia’s ability to assist it, and its dependence on China is also undercutting Tehran’s commitment to building the north-south corridor, as Beijing has a different agenda than Moscow as far as routes are concerned (see EDM, February 22, 2021, May 16, 2022). Unless sanctions against both Russia and Iran are lifted, the financing needed for this project is unlikely to come from the West.
Leaders of Russia and Iran continue to speak as if the route were already fully functioning because of the advantages that the completion of the north-south route would bring both Moscow and Tehran. Those statements, along with the shipment of Iranian arms north to Russia, have driven Western alarm. (For a useful recent survey of the former, which clearly are the reasons for the latter, see “Kaspiskii Vestnik”, December 2, 2024.) That pattern makes the correction offered by Aleksey Sidelnnikov, a Russian specialist on the Caucasus and its transportation routes, especially important (“Kaspiskii Vestnik”, January 5). After surveying what both Moscow and Iran have said over the past 25 years about the corridor as compared to what has actually happened, he suggests that it is critically important to recognize that the claims have often outrun the realities.
That pattern, he suggests, is likely to continue given the importance of the corridor once completed and the difficulties Moscow and Tehran are now facing and will likely continue to face in the next decade. Sidelnikov points to five difficulties that he says are almost certain to constitute obstacles to achieving what Moscow and Tehran hope for:
First, sanctions and the geopolitical tensions that have produced them. These trends mean that outside funds are unlikely to become available and that both Moscow and Tehran will be unable to come up with more money on their own because of their other commitments, including rising tensions between the two and the West;
Second, unresolved differences among the partners in the corridor project over its routing, especially over which country will build what on the territories of others. This has already delayed construction in northwestern Iran;
Third, the lack of existing infrastructure in both Russia and Iran and in the countries in between. This shortage involves not only the rail mainlines but feeder routes and intermodal transfer stations as well;
Fourth, the failure of the two sides and their partners in between to come up with a single tariff policy or even agreements on the harmonization of border procedures. These all slow the flow of goods and hence the importance for the participants in completing the corridor infrastructure; and
Fifth, growing concerns in these countries and others further afield about the environmental impact of the corridor. These concerns may seem small now but are growing as ever more of the trade planned shifts from land to the Caspian Sea, which is already suffering from serious environmental degradation and as Iran copes with water shortages and a burgeoning population in its ethnically fractious northwestern provinces (see EDM, November 16, 2023).
None of these problems by themself or even all of them together means that Moscow and Tehran will not be able to complete the corridor at some point. They suggest, however, three important caveats for the West to take into consideration. First, Moscow’s claims about the corridor are just that, claims rather than realities, and should be treated as such. Second, the problems that Moscow and Tehran face in this area are increasing rather than decreasing, and consequently, even today’s projected completion dates in the next decade should be treated with skepticism. Third, and by far the most important, as long as the West keeps sanctions against Russia for its war in Ukraine and Iran for its nuclear program and support for terrorism in place, Moscow and Tehran are unlikely to be able to achieve the breakthrough with the north-south corridor against the West they hope for anytime soon if at all.
- Moscow and Kiev hold ‘limited talks’ – Bloomberg
The two sides are reportedly working on an arrangement that would shield nuclear facilities from being targeted -
" Moscow has repeatedly stated that it is ready for peace talks at any moment without any preconditions other than those agreed upon in Istanbul in 2022. "
https://www.rt.com/russia/610965-moscow-kiev-limited-talks-bloomberg/
- Exposing The “Secret Owl Society” Soaring Through History -
https://www.richardcassaro.com/uncovering-the-secret-owl-society/
If Putin is losing so badly, when will Kiev finally take Moscow?
They probably will SMO Moscow to depose him but idk when
Ukraine doesnt need to take Moscow to win. They just have to retake all of Ukraine. At that point Putin's fate is probably sealed.
If Putin is "winning", then what is stopping the Russian steamroller from rolling into "Keev"?