Man, this sobering reality stuff is worlds apart from the hopium shit ZAnon emeffers are spewing... sadly, the big audience is, still, with them, I am doing all I can to open as many eyes as possible
Putin’s Army of barely trained cannon fodder is now surpassing Czar Nicholas II’s hapless WWI army in levels of institutional corruption, blatant criminality, and a sadistic indifference to the well-being of men being asked to fight in this war—er, “Special Military Operation”. These troops should turn their guns on their officers!
On a more pleasant side note... glad to see confirmation of the Segal money-laundering hypothesis. That would explain a lot, including why everything is shot in some random E. European location, and usually involves a combination of drug gangs and special forces ops. For fun, check out Space Ice on YT, he produces bitterly sarcastic mini-reviews devoted to Segal's "mega-blockbuster hit movies" along with the usual absurd Hollywood dreck.
I doubt if Segal's waddling and no-aim shooting would be much help, but perhaps he can send over one or two of his many body doubles.
Moscow is now increasing the age limit for military service to fill the depleted ranks of its forces in Ukraine. This is a reflection of the manpower difficulties Russia faces in its long war.
Visitors to the front, officials involved in meeting the military’s needs, and officers all complain about the rising number of older men in the ranks. Russian media, however, has avoided this issue
These older soldiers are less physically able to handle their jobs, sick more often, and a source of tension with younger men. This graying of the Russian army is likely to continue, as younger men continue to be reluctant to join even with the Kremlin’s various financial incentives.
Since the launch of his expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to fill the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces without sparking protests or mass emigration. These methods include recruiting soldiers from poor and non-ethnically Russian communities, raising the draft age from 27 to 30, giving prisoners the chance for release if they agree to serve in the military, arranging for immigrants and foreigners to serve in the Russian army, and most recently, offering increasingly larger bonuses to those who sign up (see EDM, October 31, November 8, 2023, April 4, 9, 16, 30, August 7, October 10). The Kremlin has taken all these steps after its one attempt at a “partial mobilization” in the fall of 2022 backfired, infuriating Russians and sparking the exodus of as many as a million citizens who wanted to avoid combat. None of these alternative strategies, however, have succeeded in providing sufficient recruits to replace the army’s growing number of losses (see EDM, September 22, 2022, June 26, September 18, 2023 Window on Eurasia, October 4).
For the next few months, Russian experts say that Moscow likely has enough money to maintain the needed influx of men into the ranks by raising signing bonuses, but they argue this method will not work forever. Moscow has had to offer ever-larger payments to get men to serve, which only highlights how unpopular the war in Ukraine has become (Riddle, April 11; T.me/anatoly_nesmiyan, August 31, reposted at Charter97, August 31). Some in Moscow are beginning to hint at another potential mobilization, despite fears of the protests it might provoke. Some argue, however, that if such a measure is taken, it will lead to a Russian collapse, resulting in victory for Ukraine (Charter97.org, May 10; Glavred, October 3; Discred.ru, October 10).
To avoid mobilization up to now, Moscow has been quietly allowing older men to enlist, including many in their 40s, 50s, 60s, and even in their 70s, despite the problems their age presents. Russian media has been limiting coverage of stories about Moscow’s decisions to raise the age limit for contract service for most ranks to 65 (Obyasnyaem.rf, June 24, 2023). Independent media outlet Vyorstka, however, has now provided further details about this development (Vyorstka, October 9). Its reporting draws on the coverage of other independent media and interviews with Russian officers and officials speaking on the condition of anonymity, highlighting what is rapidly becoming a problem for Moscow.
According to Vyorstka, since the beginning of 2024, the number of Russian contract soldiers over the age of 45 has risen significantly, creating what Russian commanders and Russian military specialists call an increasingly serious problem. These older soldiers are in poorer physical condition, less capable of carrying out military tasks, and frequently a source of tension with younger soldiers. Many believe that the growing number of these “granddads,” as other Russian soldiers now call them, is one of the biggest problems the Russian military currently faces in Ukraine. The independent news outlet adds that this problem has caught Moscow’s attention.
One of its sources, allegedly a Duma member’s staffer, shared letters his boss had received from Russian soldiers. In Ukraine, these soldiers complain that most units consist of these “granddads” and face difficulties as a result. A Russian officer, speaking on condition of anonymity to Vyorstka, confirmed that 200 to 300 personnel had been killed and wounded in his regiment over the summer and that half of those who have been sent to replace them are 50 or older. Many of them, he said, have proven incapable of handling their military tasks. Some officers insist that these older men are “better than the boys” fresh out of school, although they say that it is “sad” that their country has to use so many older men to fight its wars.
One source in the Moscow mayor’s office says that the number of older volunteers began to grow in August, something that has pushed up the average age of contract soldiers from “about 40” at the start of 2024 to “about 50” now. A second source reported that in the last several months, volunteers over the age of 45 represented “half” of those who had signed up. While Russian officials—even when speaking anonymously—say the older men will do just fine, specialists on the Russian military say that these “granddads” cannot be expected to perform as well as younger men.
Confirmation of both the growing number of older Russian men in the ranks and of the problems they present comes from data collected by Mediazona, another independent Russian outlet, and the BBC. Their data shows that there has been a dramatic increase in the average age of Russian soldiers killed in combat. So far this year, there have been 2,475 volunteers over the age of 45 who have lost their lives, approximately “half of all those killed whose age has been confirmed.” That figure is 18 percent more than for all of 2023 and three times more than for 2022. Moreover, according to Vyorstka, the number of deaths among older soldiers has accelerated over the course of this year: 16 of those over 45 died in March 2024, a number that rose to 131 in August. The rise in deaths among those even older than 45 has been still higher. So far this year, 597 men over the age of 55 have been killed in combat, 50 percent more than last year and four times the number in 2022.
If this trend continues and more Russians learn what is happening—which is likely to happen, as the Vyorstka report is beginning to be picked up by other outlets (see Meduza, October 10)—the Kremlin may find it increasingly difficult to attract older men to enlist, even if the money offered in financial incentives continues to increase. Putin may be forced to consider undertaking at least a partial mobilization next year, however explosive such a choice might prove if he is to continue the war.
Perhaps the purpose of this "war" isn't to "win", it's to create a Brave New World kind of society. Kill off 90% of the working and middle classes - anyone with IQ in range 110 down to about 80. That leaves a stratum of people in range 110 to 130 (Huxley's "Betas") - the people who do management of the "human resources" to be brought in from Africa - IQ 80 to 60 ("Gammas" and "Epsilon semi-morons") to replace restive Muslims and tribal populations and the low IQ criminal/semi-rural class - to function as a semi- or non-literate slave class. And it leaves the class of people with IQ 130 and above ("Alphas") to figure out the AI which runs things for the Master class - Putin/siloviki/etc. So the SMO is Progressive Eugenics in action, without the gas chambers.
"Eugenicists on both sides of the Atlantic argued for a two pronged programme that would increase the frequency of “socially good” genes in the population and decrease that of “bad genes.” One prong was positive eugenics, which meant manipulating human heredity or breeding, or both, to produce superior people; the other was negative eugenics, which meant improving the quality of the human race by eliminating or excluding biologically inferior people from the population.
In Britain between the wars, positive eugenic thinking led to proposals (unsuccessful ones) for family allowances that would be proportional to income. In the United States, it fostered “fitter family” competitions. These became a standard feature at a number of state fairs and were held in the “human stock” sections. At the 1924 Kansas Free Fair, winning families in the three categories—small, average, and large—were awarded a governor’s fitter family trophy. “Grade A” individuals received a medal that portrayed two diaphanously garbed parents, their arms outstretched toward their (presumably) eugenically meritorious infant. It is hard to know exactly what made these families and individuals stand out as fit, but the fact that all entrants had to take an IQ test and the Wasserman test for syphilis says something about the organisers’ views of necessary qualities." https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1127045/ and
"“In 1928, 376 college courses were dedicated to the subject of eugenics,” he wrote. During that time, popular economist Irving Fisher co-founded the American Eugenics Society, which was accompanied by the American Race Betterment Society established in 1906 and the American Breeders Magazine that began publication in 1910.
“Hundreds, perhaps thousands of Progressive Era scholars and scientists proudly called themselves eugenicists,” Leonard observed.
The state of Indiana, reported Leonard, passed its forcible sterilization law in 1907, “the first of more than thirty American states to do so.” Included among them was New Jersey’s forced sterilization law signed by then-governor and future president Woodrow Wilson. That law targeted “the hopelessly defective and criminal classes.” https://fee.org/articles/the-progressive-ideas-that-fueled-america-s-eugenics-movement/
Of course, sending "meat waves" to certain death is the most effective means of sterilization...
The "vaccines" functioned as an IQ test as well - very few PhDs got "vaccinated"... and they had the side effect of sterilization - as does "transition" surgery and hormone treatment.
I wouldn't say very few phds got vaccinated. Less than masters and undergrad degree holders, yes, but still high.
But then again, phd women spend their fertile years studying and then emerge with too high standards and no money, so I wouldn't say that phds enhances fecundity.
Now perhaps if unvaxxed phd men started fucking unvaxxed uneducated village women, the birth rate would increase. But wouldn't this just regenerate the middle intelligence class again?
Could be some good investment opportunities coming up. I've heard Kiev property prices are down 80% since their peak. If a rebuilding is planned, everything left standing will do great.
"If it were up to me, Russia would invade Uzbekistan first and force-conscript all their men into penal battalions to then be flung at NATO forces, two birds one stone style. And I’d repeat the same thing with all the other ‘stans once the Uzbeks ran out." One of the most sensible and logical things I've read that you've written. More of this please. Now that's how Russia could actually win!
Russia’s Deteriorating Infrastructure on Verge of Collapse, Threatening Tough Winter Ahead
Sergey Sukhankin
Executive Summary:
Russian officials have begun to address the degrading state of critical civilian infrastructure, particularly heating systems, ahead of the coming winter. The past few years have seen catastrophic incidents leaving many Russians without heat.
Russian officials blame numerous sources for these issues—including Russian citizens themselves—while the Kremlin’s preferred narrative is that the solution to infrastructural degradation is nationalization.
Public discontent caused by worsening living standards and mounting socio-economic challenges could prove to be far more damaging to the Russian regime than military losses in Ukraine, as these issues more directly affect the lives of everyday Russians.
Anatoly Seryshev, a Russian presidential plenipotentiary envoy in the Siberian federal district, recently held a meeting dedicated to the Siberian regions’ preparedness for the coming winter and the state of critical civilian infrastructure. In his speech, Seryshev highlighted that Russian President Vladimir Putin considers the matter important enough to be personally overseeing efforts to appease the worries of those Siberian residents significantly affected by Russia’s failing infrastructure (Tvtomsk.ru, September 24). It would be catastrophic if infrastructural failures similar to those that occurred in the Urals and Siberia last winter were seen again, putting the wider collapse of Russian infrastructure on full display (NGS.ru, January 12). Given past occurrences and structural problems in this industry, however, new incidents are likely to occur in the coming months. Russia’s crumbling infrastructure, especially the increasingly failing heating plants, demonstrates the degradation of Russian society as the Kremlin focuses its attention beyond Russia’s borders and away from its suffering people.
Major incidents with civilian infrastructure are hardly news in Russia, where such episodes are commonplace every year (Fedpress.ru, November 29, 2022). Last winter was particularly disastrous, however, across the entirety of Russia, including temporarily occupied Crimea and Sevastopol. At least 577 major incidents affecting critical infrastructure were recorded in 59 regions. The most affected regions were Sverdlovsk oblast (42 incidents) and the city of Yekaterinburg, where, amid drastic temperature drops, 324 multi-level apartment buildings remained without heating for several days. Other regions affected by incidents were Volgograd (39), Moscow (31), and Novosibirsk (30) oblasts. Russia-based reporters detailed how approximately 3 million Russians lost central heating last winter (Sibreal.org, February 12).
According to Sergey Sokhranov from the Smolensk-based “Kontrol” housing and communal service, Russia experiences approximately 7,000 incidents related to its heating networks annually, primarily due to the attrition of infrastructure. In St. Petersburg, Russia’s second-largest city and the cultural capital, the level of attrition in infrastructure has reached a staggering 65–70 percent, and only in Moscow—which enjoys a huge influx of money and steady logistical support—is the situation somewhat better (Mskgazeta.ru, January 5). Notably, the above-mentioned incidents resulted in a wave of public discontent, with many Siberia- and Ural-based residents blaming local officials and appealing to Putin, asking, “Why is it not Europe, but us who are freezing to death?” (Sibreal.org, December 17, 2023).
Russian officials have provided varied responses to the decline of Russia’s infrastructure. In 2023, some officials blamed local residents for the incidents, arguing that local populations in the most affected regions should have been more proactive in addressing communal and housing issues well before the cold struck (RG.ru, January 17, 2023). Andrey Gurulyov, a Russian politician and former army officer, argued that the solution to this problem should be to drastically increase the price of utilities. He admitted, however, that this measure would not be popular and thus “should not be introduced right now [given the war].” He believed that the income generated from the price increases would be used to update and maintain infrastructure, and that this was the only viable way to avoid future outages and degradation (T.me/agurulev, January 16).
The Kremlin decided to promote what they suspected to be the most convenient argument for Russian citizens. They scapegoated the “unscrupulous private sector” in charge of some sectors of Russia’s critical infrastructure. For instance, following several incidents, Putin ordered the nationalization of a private heating plant in the Moscow oblast, where failures recently left 150,000 residents without heat (Riamo.ru, January 9; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 12). Similarly, Vyacheslav Volodin, the chairman of the Russian State Duma, also spoke in favor of further nationalizing infrastructure (Realty.ria.ru, December 16). Russian sources and journalists, however, are less optimistic. Based on their investigations, they find that the main problem is not an increased presence of the private sector in this industry, but quite the opposite. Instead, growing state control is resulting in the communal and public housing system becoming much more cumbersome, ineffective, and prone to corruption and red tape (Novayagazeta.eu, February 12).
Observing current trends, the upcoming winter may also pose challenges to Russia’s critical infrastructure. In addition to the attrition of infrastructure and the lack of funding for ensuring these heating plants continue to operate throughout the winter, growing electricity consumption in Siberia could pose a new threat to the sustainability of local power grids. Electricity consumption is expected to rise in Irkutsk oblast and Krasnoyarsk krai in the next year by at least 4.1 percent, mainly due to the growing power demands of mining communities. Over the past eight months, electricity consumption increased by 59.5 percent compared to the same period in 2023 (Ogirk.ru, September 4). While Russian officials are warning that the likelihood of new incidents of a similar nature is high across all of Russia, specific attention has been paid to the Novosibirsk oblast. There, the local governor reported that the level of attrition of local infrastructure is close to 72 percent (Fedpress.ru, May 13).
Local officials and respective agencies are assuring the public that they “have done their homework” and will try to prevent situations seen during the previous winter from occurring. At the same time, these actors cautiously state that it is difficult to predict how temperatures will change during the winter (Fedpress.ru, September 19). Notably, Siberian officials are already claiming that due to a severe lack of funding and other problems, Siberia will face a significant deficit of electricity in 2029 (Sia.ru, September 11). Currently, communal services are diligently working to solve these issues, especially in Novosibirsk, where preparations for the coming winter began in May (Fedpress.ru, September 19). Local authorities are training for potential emergencies related to the collapse of the local heating system based on what occurred last winter (Atas.info, September 5). Despite these efforts, Siberia’s heating infrastructure has already started to show signs of strain. Issues are already being seen, as in October, 200 residents of Novosibirst have complained about the heating in their apartments with 84 households remaining without electricity (Gorsite.ru, October 10). Public discontent caused by worsening living standards and mounting socio-economic challenges in Russia damage Russia’s incumbent regime far more than the military losses in Ukraine since 2022, more directly affect the lives of everyday Russians (see EDM, August 20).
President, Kyiv School of Economics; Minister of economy, Ukraine, 2019-2020; Associate professor, University of Pittsburgh
I am back in Ukraine and the mood is pitch black. Ukraine feels betrayed.
Russia is advancing, with no signs of willingness to negotiate. In this context, talks of peace, ceasefires, or deals feel completely detached from reality
And there you have it. NATO will have to escalate, in a bat-sh*t crazy fashion, because the looming victory of Russia will annihilate the credibility of the Alliance.
We Finns were so stupid that we let ourselves to be dragged into this death-spiral of NATO, engulfing Europe.
1:08 AM · Oct 16, 2024
Elina Valtonen @elinavaltonen
If we allow Russia to win in Ukraine, then essentially we end the credibility of our deterrence.
Meanwhile Trump wants to use military against citizens because “The Donald” is ticked! And the Pentagon just agreed they have declared war on the people. Or is it just an S.M.O. Smokescreen?
From Quora (is this true? Can someone corroborate this?):
Wife of the soldier killed in the Kursk region was refused $50,000 death bonus for those fighting in the war in Ukraine. When she complained, the authorities said, “Sorry, tough luck,” — because in the Kursk region, it’s not the “special military operation”.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has turned into the first full-scale drone war. Ukraine is dominating this aspect of the conflict through its innovation and leadership in drone production.
Moscow is lagging behind in the drone war, relying on outdated Iranian drones and facing technological limitations due to global sanctions, despite efforts such as increased drone production and training programs.
While Ukraine leads in drone production and continues to attack Russia’s own infrastructure, Russia still has more resources than Ukraine. For Ukraine to turn the tide of war, it needs to be able to target deeper into Russia more regularly.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has effectively become the world’s first full-scale drone war. Ukraine is winning, becoming the world leader in combat drone production (see EDM, October 8). This achievement did not come out of nowhere—even in Soviet times, the Ukrainian city of Dnepro (formerly Dnepropetrovsk) was the industrial heart of the Soviet space industry, where satellites and launch vehicles were produced (Nashemisto.dp.ua, April 12). This war has shown how new technology for producing combat drones can successfully be used with antiquated methods. Such a synthesis, however, has become a problem for Russia’s military factories since Moscow has lost access to many modern technologies due to global sanctions. Russia’s reliance on foreign weapons and Ukraine’s dominance in using drones against Russia, both against Russian targets within Ukrainian territory and on Russian soil against the country’s deteriorating military-industrial complex, demonstrates how Russia is falling behind in the battle of military innovation.
Today, Russia is primarily using technologically outdated Iranian “Shahed” drones and even has a plant for their production in Yelabuga, Tatarstan (see EDM, March 6, 2023, March 4, May 14, September 18). Ukrainian drones successfully attacked the plant, despite it being 1,200 kilometers (745 miles) from the Ukrainian border (BBC Russian Service, April 2; see EDM, April 11). More impressive was the Ukrainian drone attack on the Olenya military airfield in Murmansk oblast, an Arctic site where Russia had relocated its aircraft to avoid Ukrainian strikes. In terms of operational ranges, 1,800 kilometers (1,120 miles) has become a feasible distance for Ukrainian drone strikes (NV.ua, September 12).
Russian propaganda traditionally downplays the significance of Ukrainian drone attacks, calling the destruction of its facilities the result of “falling debris from downed drones” (see EDM, October 15). Russia’s avoidance of reporting on drone strikes creates more questions for the public. The most recent example of this concerned how a giant military warehouse in Toropets, Tver oblast, was destroyed by such “debris.” While the media claimed “falling debris” caused the building’s destruction, at the time of the attack, seismic laboratories recorded an earthquake in the region when there had never been an earthquake before (TASS, September 17; Region.expert, September 19). A seismic event of this level in a region without any recorded seismic activity would not have been able to occur simply from falling debris, laying bare the falsehoods in Russian media’s narrative regarding the situation.
Ukrainian drones have hit numerous Russian military and energy facilities over the course of the war. In recent weeks alone, in addition to the warehouse in Toropets, an equally large weapons storage facility in Yeysk, Krasnodar krai was destroyed (Svoboda, October 9). Similarly, a state of emergency was declared in Rostov oblast due to drone strikes, and the largest oil depot in Feodosia, Crimea burned down (RBC, September 30; Svoboda, October 9).
Ukrainian drone raids in various Russian regions have not caused a sense of unity in Russian society. This is in stark contrast to how attacks on Ukrainian cities are felt throughout the country. Even though Ukraine is a unitary state according to its constitution, practically speaking, it is much less centralized than Russia. The Russian Federation, on the contrary, is built on Moscow’s political, economic, and symbolic hyper-centralism. Therefore, only drone attacks on Moscow are likely to make a significant impression on the public, such as when Ukrainian drones attacked the Moscow City business center in July 2023, the largest capital oil terminal in Kapotnya in September 2024, or, most notably, when a Ukrainian drone sparked panic after it exploded over the Kremlin in May 2023 (BBC Russian Service, May 3, 2023; Forbes.ru, July 23, 2023; Svoboda.org, September 2). The Russian public will likely not have a significant reaction to such attacks unless the Kremlin itself collapses. The current Russian state is built on the “sacredness” of imperial power, and the destruction of its symbols could change political consciousness and attitudes toward war.
The Kremlin understands that it is losing the drone war. In addition to the technical lag, Russia’s deficiencies in drone warfare demonstrate the difference in social organization between Russia and Ukraine. In Ukraine, drones are not infrequently assembled by civil society organizations from parts provided by the state. Conversely, in Russia such an idea is impossible due to secrecy, high-level bureaucracy, and mutual distrust between various military structures (see EDM, June 20; Severreal.org, September 24). Russia, however, is trying to compensate for this lag by training schoolchildren to fly drones, even though this training is unlikely to be effective since technology is rapidly improving, and what is taught in schools may already be outdated by the time they are called up for military service (Svoboda.org, July 1; see EDM, September 9). While Russian President Vladimir Putin calls on Russian arms manufacturers to assemble 1.5 million drones annually, he himself hides from possible drone attacks by changing residences and turning off the transponders on his plane (Kasparov.ru, September 20; Svoboda.org, October 7). In addition, the Kremlin is now recruiting drone assemblers from Africa, clearly demonstrating the very “neocolonialist” tendencies it accuses Western countries of (The Moscow Times, May 28).
Whether Ukrainian drone attacks could turn the tide of this war is up for debate. The advantage of drones is that they are relatively easy to assemble, cost significantly less than the anti-aircraft missiles used to shoot them down, and can fly at low altitudes, remaining invisible to radar (Severreal.org, June 30). The main problem, however, is their low speed compared to manned jet aircraft, and attempts to increase this speed would lead to increased manufacturing costs (Forbes.ua, August 27).
For Ukraine, combat drones mainly provide a venue for tactical success and have a powerful psychological impact, specifically on Russians in the various targeted regions. These attacks deprive these Russian citizens of the idea “the war is somewhere far away,” since Ukrainian drones can now target nearly any city in the European part of Russia. Drones are still not capable, however, of moving the front line and liberating the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia.
While the drone war is quantitative in nature, Russia still has more resources than Ukraine. To achieve a qualitative transition, where Ukraine could have a meaningful advantage against Russia, Western countries would need to increase their supply of long-range missiles to Ukraine and remove restrictions on their use. These deliveries continue to be postponed, and permission to use these weapons on Russian soil is still being debated among Western leaders. While Ukraine is dominating the drone war, it still requires Western support and supplies to withstand the Russian storm.
Man, this sobering reality stuff is worlds apart from the hopium shit ZAnon emeffers are spewing... sadly, the big audience is, still, with them, I am doing all I can to open as many eyes as possible
Putin’s Army of barely trained cannon fodder is now surpassing Czar Nicholas II’s hapless WWI army in levels of institutional corruption, blatant criminality, and a sadistic indifference to the well-being of men being asked to fight in this war—er, “Special Military Operation”. These troops should turn their guns on their officers!
> institutional corruption, blatant criminality, and a sadistic indifference
Bro, it's like you're describing the whole of Russian history.
This is the kind of thing the Euros find so abhorrent and wish to distance themselves from.
Only xenocrats behave this way to their underlings.
For sure.
But when was Russia last not ruled by xenocrats?
On a more pleasant side note... glad to see confirmation of the Segal money-laundering hypothesis. That would explain a lot, including why everything is shot in some random E. European location, and usually involves a combination of drug gangs and special forces ops. For fun, check out Space Ice on YT, he produces bitterly sarcastic mini-reviews devoted to Segal's "mega-blockbuster hit movies" along with the usual absurd Hollywood dreck.
I doubt if Segal's waddling and no-aim shooting would be much help, but perhaps he can send over one or two of his many body doubles.
WINNING!
Moscow Forced to Fill Ranks With Older Men
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
Moscow is now increasing the age limit for military service to fill the depleted ranks of its forces in Ukraine. This is a reflection of the manpower difficulties Russia faces in its long war.
Visitors to the front, officials involved in meeting the military’s needs, and officers all complain about the rising number of older men in the ranks. Russian media, however, has avoided this issue
These older soldiers are less physically able to handle their jobs, sick more often, and a source of tension with younger men. This graying of the Russian army is likely to continue, as younger men continue to be reluctant to join even with the Kremlin’s various financial incentives.
Since the launch of his expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to fill the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces without sparking protests or mass emigration. These methods include recruiting soldiers from poor and non-ethnically Russian communities, raising the draft age from 27 to 30, giving prisoners the chance for release if they agree to serve in the military, arranging for immigrants and foreigners to serve in the Russian army, and most recently, offering increasingly larger bonuses to those who sign up (see EDM, October 31, November 8, 2023, April 4, 9, 16, 30, August 7, October 10). The Kremlin has taken all these steps after its one attempt at a “partial mobilization” in the fall of 2022 backfired, infuriating Russians and sparking the exodus of as many as a million citizens who wanted to avoid combat. None of these alternative strategies, however, have succeeded in providing sufficient recruits to replace the army’s growing number of losses (see EDM, September 22, 2022, June 26, September 18, 2023 Window on Eurasia, October 4).
For the next few months, Russian experts say that Moscow likely has enough money to maintain the needed influx of men into the ranks by raising signing bonuses, but they argue this method will not work forever. Moscow has had to offer ever-larger payments to get men to serve, which only highlights how unpopular the war in Ukraine has become (Riddle, April 11; T.me/anatoly_nesmiyan, August 31, reposted at Charter97, August 31). Some in Moscow are beginning to hint at another potential mobilization, despite fears of the protests it might provoke. Some argue, however, that if such a measure is taken, it will lead to a Russian collapse, resulting in victory for Ukraine (Charter97.org, May 10; Glavred, October 3; Discred.ru, October 10).
To avoid mobilization up to now, Moscow has been quietly allowing older men to enlist, including many in their 40s, 50s, 60s, and even in their 70s, despite the problems their age presents. Russian media has been limiting coverage of stories about Moscow’s decisions to raise the age limit for contract service for most ranks to 65 (Obyasnyaem.rf, June 24, 2023). Independent media outlet Vyorstka, however, has now provided further details about this development (Vyorstka, October 9). Its reporting draws on the coverage of other independent media and interviews with Russian officers and officials speaking on the condition of anonymity, highlighting what is rapidly becoming a problem for Moscow.
According to Vyorstka, since the beginning of 2024, the number of Russian contract soldiers over the age of 45 has risen significantly, creating what Russian commanders and Russian military specialists call an increasingly serious problem. These older soldiers are in poorer physical condition, less capable of carrying out military tasks, and frequently a source of tension with younger soldiers. Many believe that the growing number of these “granddads,” as other Russian soldiers now call them, is one of the biggest problems the Russian military currently faces in Ukraine. The independent news outlet adds that this problem has caught Moscow’s attention.
One of its sources, allegedly a Duma member’s staffer, shared letters his boss had received from Russian soldiers. In Ukraine, these soldiers complain that most units consist of these “granddads” and face difficulties as a result. A Russian officer, speaking on condition of anonymity to Vyorstka, confirmed that 200 to 300 personnel had been killed and wounded in his regiment over the summer and that half of those who have been sent to replace them are 50 or older. Many of them, he said, have proven incapable of handling their military tasks. Some officers insist that these older men are “better than the boys” fresh out of school, although they say that it is “sad” that their country has to use so many older men to fight its wars.
One source in the Moscow mayor’s office says that the number of older volunteers began to grow in August, something that has pushed up the average age of contract soldiers from “about 40” at the start of 2024 to “about 50” now. A second source reported that in the last several months, volunteers over the age of 45 represented “half” of those who had signed up. While Russian officials—even when speaking anonymously—say the older men will do just fine, specialists on the Russian military say that these “granddads” cannot be expected to perform as well as younger men.
Confirmation of both the growing number of older Russian men in the ranks and of the problems they present comes from data collected by Mediazona, another independent Russian outlet, and the BBC. Their data shows that there has been a dramatic increase in the average age of Russian soldiers killed in combat. So far this year, there have been 2,475 volunteers over the age of 45 who have lost their lives, approximately “half of all those killed whose age has been confirmed.” That figure is 18 percent more than for all of 2023 and three times more than for 2022. Moreover, according to Vyorstka, the number of deaths among older soldiers has accelerated over the course of this year: 16 of those over 45 died in March 2024, a number that rose to 131 in August. The rise in deaths among those even older than 45 has been still higher. So far this year, 597 men over the age of 55 have been killed in combat, 50 percent more than last year and four times the number in 2022.
If this trend continues and more Russians learn what is happening—which is likely to happen, as the Vyorstka report is beginning to be picked up by other outlets (see Meduza, October 10)—the Kremlin may find it increasingly difficult to attract older men to enlist, even if the money offered in financial incentives continues to increase. Putin may be forced to consider undertaking at least a partial mobilization next year, however explosive such a choice might prove if he is to continue the war.
Perhaps the purpose of this "war" isn't to "win", it's to create a Brave New World kind of society. Kill off 90% of the working and middle classes - anyone with IQ in range 110 down to about 80. That leaves a stratum of people in range 110 to 130 (Huxley's "Betas") - the people who do management of the "human resources" to be brought in from Africa - IQ 80 to 60 ("Gammas" and "Epsilon semi-morons") to replace restive Muslims and tribal populations and the low IQ criminal/semi-rural class - to function as a semi- or non-literate slave class. And it leaves the class of people with IQ 130 and above ("Alphas") to figure out the AI which runs things for the Master class - Putin/siloviki/etc. So the SMO is Progressive Eugenics in action, without the gas chambers.
"Eugenicists on both sides of the Atlantic argued for a two pronged programme that would increase the frequency of “socially good” genes in the population and decrease that of “bad genes.” One prong was positive eugenics, which meant manipulating human heredity or breeding, or both, to produce superior people; the other was negative eugenics, which meant improving the quality of the human race by eliminating or excluding biologically inferior people from the population.
In Britain between the wars, positive eugenic thinking led to proposals (unsuccessful ones) for family allowances that would be proportional to income. In the United States, it fostered “fitter family” competitions. These became a standard feature at a number of state fairs and were held in the “human stock” sections. At the 1924 Kansas Free Fair, winning families in the three categories—small, average, and large—were awarded a governor’s fitter family trophy. “Grade A” individuals received a medal that portrayed two diaphanously garbed parents, their arms outstretched toward their (presumably) eugenically meritorious infant. It is hard to know exactly what made these families and individuals stand out as fit, but the fact that all entrants had to take an IQ test and the Wasserman test for syphilis says something about the organisers’ views of necessary qualities." https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1127045/ and
"“In 1928, 376 college courses were dedicated to the subject of eugenics,” he wrote. During that time, popular economist Irving Fisher co-founded the American Eugenics Society, which was accompanied by the American Race Betterment Society established in 1906 and the American Breeders Magazine that began publication in 1910.
“Hundreds, perhaps thousands of Progressive Era scholars and scientists proudly called themselves eugenicists,” Leonard observed.
The state of Indiana, reported Leonard, passed its forcible sterilization law in 1907, “the first of more than thirty American states to do so.” Included among them was New Jersey’s forced sterilization law signed by then-governor and future president Woodrow Wilson. That law targeted “the hopelessly defective and criminal classes.” https://fee.org/articles/the-progressive-ideas-that-fueled-america-s-eugenics-movement/
Of course, sending "meat waves" to certain death is the most effective means of sterilization...
The "vaccines" functioned as an IQ test as well - very few PhDs got "vaccinated"... and they had the side effect of sterilization - as does "transition" surgery and hormone treatment.
I wouldn't say very few phds got vaccinated. Less than masters and undergrad degree holders, yes, but still high.
But then again, phd women spend their fertile years studying and then emerge with too high standards and no money, so I wouldn't say that phds enhances fecundity.
Now perhaps if unvaxxed phd men started fucking unvaxxed uneducated village women, the birth rate would increase. But wouldn't this just regenerate the middle intelligence class again?
Could be some good investment opportunities coming up. I've heard Kiev property prices are down 80% since their peak. If a rebuilding is planned, everything left standing will do great.
"If it were up to me, Russia would invade Uzbekistan first and force-conscript all their men into penal battalions to then be flung at NATO forces, two birds one stone style. And I’d repeat the same thing with all the other ‘stans once the Uzbeks ran out." One of the most sensible and logical things I've read that you've written. More of this please. Now that's how Russia could actually win!
Russia’s Deteriorating Infrastructure on Verge of Collapse, Threatening Tough Winter Ahead
Sergey Sukhankin
Executive Summary:
Russian officials have begun to address the degrading state of critical civilian infrastructure, particularly heating systems, ahead of the coming winter. The past few years have seen catastrophic incidents leaving many Russians without heat.
Russian officials blame numerous sources for these issues—including Russian citizens themselves—while the Kremlin’s preferred narrative is that the solution to infrastructural degradation is nationalization.
Public discontent caused by worsening living standards and mounting socio-economic challenges could prove to be far more damaging to the Russian regime than military losses in Ukraine, as these issues more directly affect the lives of everyday Russians.
Anatoly Seryshev, a Russian presidential plenipotentiary envoy in the Siberian federal district, recently held a meeting dedicated to the Siberian regions’ preparedness for the coming winter and the state of critical civilian infrastructure. In his speech, Seryshev highlighted that Russian President Vladimir Putin considers the matter important enough to be personally overseeing efforts to appease the worries of those Siberian residents significantly affected by Russia’s failing infrastructure (Tvtomsk.ru, September 24). It would be catastrophic if infrastructural failures similar to those that occurred in the Urals and Siberia last winter were seen again, putting the wider collapse of Russian infrastructure on full display (NGS.ru, January 12). Given past occurrences and structural problems in this industry, however, new incidents are likely to occur in the coming months. Russia’s crumbling infrastructure, especially the increasingly failing heating plants, demonstrates the degradation of Russian society as the Kremlin focuses its attention beyond Russia’s borders and away from its suffering people.
Major incidents with civilian infrastructure are hardly news in Russia, where such episodes are commonplace every year (Fedpress.ru, November 29, 2022). Last winter was particularly disastrous, however, across the entirety of Russia, including temporarily occupied Crimea and Sevastopol. At least 577 major incidents affecting critical infrastructure were recorded in 59 regions. The most affected regions were Sverdlovsk oblast (42 incidents) and the city of Yekaterinburg, where, amid drastic temperature drops, 324 multi-level apartment buildings remained without heating for several days. Other regions affected by incidents were Volgograd (39), Moscow (31), and Novosibirsk (30) oblasts. Russia-based reporters detailed how approximately 3 million Russians lost central heating last winter (Sibreal.org, February 12).
According to Sergey Sokhranov from the Smolensk-based “Kontrol” housing and communal service, Russia experiences approximately 7,000 incidents related to its heating networks annually, primarily due to the attrition of infrastructure. In St. Petersburg, Russia’s second-largest city and the cultural capital, the level of attrition in infrastructure has reached a staggering 65–70 percent, and only in Moscow—which enjoys a huge influx of money and steady logistical support—is the situation somewhat better (Mskgazeta.ru, January 5). Notably, the above-mentioned incidents resulted in a wave of public discontent, with many Siberia- and Ural-based residents blaming local officials and appealing to Putin, asking, “Why is it not Europe, but us who are freezing to death?” (Sibreal.org, December 17, 2023).
Russian officials have provided varied responses to the decline of Russia’s infrastructure. In 2023, some officials blamed local residents for the incidents, arguing that local populations in the most affected regions should have been more proactive in addressing communal and housing issues well before the cold struck (RG.ru, January 17, 2023). Andrey Gurulyov, a Russian politician and former army officer, argued that the solution to this problem should be to drastically increase the price of utilities. He admitted, however, that this measure would not be popular and thus “should not be introduced right now [given the war].” He believed that the income generated from the price increases would be used to update and maintain infrastructure, and that this was the only viable way to avoid future outages and degradation (T.me/agurulev, January 16).
The Kremlin decided to promote what they suspected to be the most convenient argument for Russian citizens. They scapegoated the “unscrupulous private sector” in charge of some sectors of Russia’s critical infrastructure. For instance, following several incidents, Putin ordered the nationalization of a private heating plant in the Moscow oblast, where failures recently left 150,000 residents without heat (Riamo.ru, January 9; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 12). Similarly, Vyacheslav Volodin, the chairman of the Russian State Duma, also spoke in favor of further nationalizing infrastructure (Realty.ria.ru, December 16). Russian sources and journalists, however, are less optimistic. Based on their investigations, they find that the main problem is not an increased presence of the private sector in this industry, but quite the opposite. Instead, growing state control is resulting in the communal and public housing system becoming much more cumbersome, ineffective, and prone to corruption and red tape (Novayagazeta.eu, February 12).
Observing current trends, the upcoming winter may also pose challenges to Russia’s critical infrastructure. In addition to the attrition of infrastructure and the lack of funding for ensuring these heating plants continue to operate throughout the winter, growing electricity consumption in Siberia could pose a new threat to the sustainability of local power grids. Electricity consumption is expected to rise in Irkutsk oblast and Krasnoyarsk krai in the next year by at least 4.1 percent, mainly due to the growing power demands of mining communities. Over the past eight months, electricity consumption increased by 59.5 percent compared to the same period in 2023 (Ogirk.ru, September 4). While Russian officials are warning that the likelihood of new incidents of a similar nature is high across all of Russia, specific attention has been paid to the Novosibirsk oblast. There, the local governor reported that the level of attrition of local infrastructure is close to 72 percent (Fedpress.ru, May 13).
Local officials and respective agencies are assuring the public that they “have done their homework” and will try to prevent situations seen during the previous winter from occurring. At the same time, these actors cautiously state that it is difficult to predict how temperatures will change during the winter (Fedpress.ru, September 19). Notably, Siberian officials are already claiming that due to a severe lack of funding and other problems, Siberia will face a significant deficit of electricity in 2029 (Sia.ru, September 11). Currently, communal services are diligently working to solve these issues, especially in Novosibirsk, where preparations for the coming winter began in May (Fedpress.ru, September 19). Local authorities are training for potential emergencies related to the collapse of the local heating system based on what occurred last winter (Atas.info, September 5). Despite these efforts, Siberia’s heating infrastructure has already started to show signs of strain. Issues are already being seen, as in October, 200 residents of Novosibirst have complained about the heating in their apartments with 84 households remaining without electricity (Gorsite.ru, October 10). Public discontent caused by worsening living standards and mounting socio-economic challenges in Russia damage Russia’s incumbent regime far more than the military losses in Ukraine since 2022, more directly affect the lives of everyday Russians (see EDM, August 20).
The entire situation is approaching criticality:
https://x.com/Mylovanov/status/1846202315524526169
Tymofiy Mylovanov @Mylovanov
President, Kyiv School of Economics; Minister of economy, Ukraine, 2019-2020; Associate professor, University of Pittsburgh
I am back in Ukraine and the mood is pitch black. Ukraine feels betrayed.
Russia is advancing, with no signs of willingness to negotiate. In this context, talks of peace, ceasefires, or deals feel completely detached from reality
https://x.com/mtmalinen/status/1846161239434539032
Tuomas Malinen @mtmalinen
And there you have it. NATO will have to escalate, in a bat-sh*t crazy fashion, because the looming victory of Russia will annihilate the credibility of the Alliance.
We Finns were so stupid that we let ourselves to be dragged into this death-spiral of NATO, engulfing Europe.
1:08 AM · Oct 16, 2024
Elina Valtonen @elinavaltonen
If we allow Russia to win in Ukraine, then essentially we end the credibility of our deterrence.
My interview with the
@FT
From ft.com
12:41 AM · Oct 16, 2024
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Steve Segall is a self confessed CIA asset.
Meanwhile Trump wants to use military against citizens because “The Donald” is ticked! And the Pentagon just agreed they have declared war on the people. Or is it just an S.M.O. Smokescreen?
From Quora (is this true? Can someone corroborate this?):
Wife of the soldier killed in the Kursk region was refused $50,000 death bonus for those fighting in the war in Ukraine. When she complained, the authorities said, “Sorry, tough luck,” — because in the Kursk region, it’s not the “special military operation”.
Ukrainian Drone War Shakes Up Russian Society
Vadim Shtepa
Executive Summary:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has turned into the first full-scale drone war. Ukraine is dominating this aspect of the conflict through its innovation and leadership in drone production.
Moscow is lagging behind in the drone war, relying on outdated Iranian drones and facing technological limitations due to global sanctions, despite efforts such as increased drone production and training programs.
While Ukraine leads in drone production and continues to attack Russia’s own infrastructure, Russia still has more resources than Ukraine. For Ukraine to turn the tide of war, it needs to be able to target deeper into Russia more regularly.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has effectively become the world’s first full-scale drone war. Ukraine is winning, becoming the world leader in combat drone production (see EDM, October 8). This achievement did not come out of nowhere—even in Soviet times, the Ukrainian city of Dnepro (formerly Dnepropetrovsk) was the industrial heart of the Soviet space industry, where satellites and launch vehicles were produced (Nashemisto.dp.ua, April 12). This war has shown how new technology for producing combat drones can successfully be used with antiquated methods. Such a synthesis, however, has become a problem for Russia’s military factories since Moscow has lost access to many modern technologies due to global sanctions. Russia’s reliance on foreign weapons and Ukraine’s dominance in using drones against Russia, both against Russian targets within Ukrainian territory and on Russian soil against the country’s deteriorating military-industrial complex, demonstrates how Russia is falling behind in the battle of military innovation.
Today, Russia is primarily using technologically outdated Iranian “Shahed” drones and even has a plant for their production in Yelabuga, Tatarstan (see EDM, March 6, 2023, March 4, May 14, September 18). Ukrainian drones successfully attacked the plant, despite it being 1,200 kilometers (745 miles) from the Ukrainian border (BBC Russian Service, April 2; see EDM, April 11). More impressive was the Ukrainian drone attack on the Olenya military airfield in Murmansk oblast, an Arctic site where Russia had relocated its aircraft to avoid Ukrainian strikes. In terms of operational ranges, 1,800 kilometers (1,120 miles) has become a feasible distance for Ukrainian drone strikes (NV.ua, September 12).
Russian propaganda traditionally downplays the significance of Ukrainian drone attacks, calling the destruction of its facilities the result of “falling debris from downed drones” (see EDM, October 15). Russia’s avoidance of reporting on drone strikes creates more questions for the public. The most recent example of this concerned how a giant military warehouse in Toropets, Tver oblast, was destroyed by such “debris.” While the media claimed “falling debris” caused the building’s destruction, at the time of the attack, seismic laboratories recorded an earthquake in the region when there had never been an earthquake before (TASS, September 17; Region.expert, September 19). A seismic event of this level in a region without any recorded seismic activity would not have been able to occur simply from falling debris, laying bare the falsehoods in Russian media’s narrative regarding the situation.
Ukrainian drones have hit numerous Russian military and energy facilities over the course of the war. In recent weeks alone, in addition to the warehouse in Toropets, an equally large weapons storage facility in Yeysk, Krasnodar krai was destroyed (Svoboda, October 9). Similarly, a state of emergency was declared in Rostov oblast due to drone strikes, and the largest oil depot in Feodosia, Crimea burned down (RBC, September 30; Svoboda, October 9).
Ukrainian drone raids in various Russian regions have not caused a sense of unity in Russian society. This is in stark contrast to how attacks on Ukrainian cities are felt throughout the country. Even though Ukraine is a unitary state according to its constitution, practically speaking, it is much less centralized than Russia. The Russian Federation, on the contrary, is built on Moscow’s political, economic, and symbolic hyper-centralism. Therefore, only drone attacks on Moscow are likely to make a significant impression on the public, such as when Ukrainian drones attacked the Moscow City business center in July 2023, the largest capital oil terminal in Kapotnya in September 2024, or, most notably, when a Ukrainian drone sparked panic after it exploded over the Kremlin in May 2023 (BBC Russian Service, May 3, 2023; Forbes.ru, July 23, 2023; Svoboda.org, September 2). The Russian public will likely not have a significant reaction to such attacks unless the Kremlin itself collapses. The current Russian state is built on the “sacredness” of imperial power, and the destruction of its symbols could change political consciousness and attitudes toward war.
The Kremlin understands that it is losing the drone war. In addition to the technical lag, Russia’s deficiencies in drone warfare demonstrate the difference in social organization between Russia and Ukraine. In Ukraine, drones are not infrequently assembled by civil society organizations from parts provided by the state. Conversely, in Russia such an idea is impossible due to secrecy, high-level bureaucracy, and mutual distrust between various military structures (see EDM, June 20; Severreal.org, September 24). Russia, however, is trying to compensate for this lag by training schoolchildren to fly drones, even though this training is unlikely to be effective since technology is rapidly improving, and what is taught in schools may already be outdated by the time they are called up for military service (Svoboda.org, July 1; see EDM, September 9). While Russian President Vladimir Putin calls on Russian arms manufacturers to assemble 1.5 million drones annually, he himself hides from possible drone attacks by changing residences and turning off the transponders on his plane (Kasparov.ru, September 20; Svoboda.org, October 7). In addition, the Kremlin is now recruiting drone assemblers from Africa, clearly demonstrating the very “neocolonialist” tendencies it accuses Western countries of (The Moscow Times, May 28).
Whether Ukrainian drone attacks could turn the tide of this war is up for debate. The advantage of drones is that they are relatively easy to assemble, cost significantly less than the anti-aircraft missiles used to shoot them down, and can fly at low altitudes, remaining invisible to radar (Severreal.org, June 30). The main problem, however, is their low speed compared to manned jet aircraft, and attempts to increase this speed would lead to increased manufacturing costs (Forbes.ua, August 27).
For Ukraine, combat drones mainly provide a venue for tactical success and have a powerful psychological impact, specifically on Russians in the various targeted regions. These attacks deprive these Russian citizens of the idea “the war is somewhere far away,” since Ukrainian drones can now target nearly any city in the European part of Russia. Drones are still not capable, however, of moving the front line and liberating the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia.
While the drone war is quantitative in nature, Russia still has more resources than Ukraine. To achieve a qualitative transition, where Ukraine could have a meaningful advantage against Russia, Western countries would need to increase their supply of long-range missiles to Ukraine and remove restrictions on their use. These deliveries continue to be postponed, and permission to use these weapons on Russian soil is still being debated among Western leaders. While Ukraine is dominating the drone war, it still requires Western support and supplies to withstand the Russian storm.
Trump may not get a chance to call off the war in Uktaine
This is getting really freaky
https://x.com/AlArabiya_Brk/status/1845951965219483948
العربية عاجل
@AlArabiya_Brk
فوكس نيوز: بايدن حذر إيران بأنه سيعتبر أي محاولة لاغتيال ترمب "عملا حربيا" #العربية_عاجل
Translated from Arabic by
Fox News: Biden Warned Iran He Would Consider Any Attempt to Assassinate Trump an 'Act of War' #العربية_عاجل
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11:16 AM · Oct 15, 2024
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